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CONSUl·IBR MARKETS FOR WARRANTIES 
ABSTRACT 
This paper considora consumer markota for warranties whon 
consumers are imperfectly informed about both product and warr�.nty 
prices and about which firms sell with warrantioa and which fiau· ioll 
without warranties, We characterize necessary and snf f icient 
conditions for existence of the various equilibrium configuration:. of 
price and warranty coverage that can ariao in two paradigm cases; 111.hon 
all consumers prefer wnrrantiea and when none do, Our resuits sn&fle$t 
that firms will exploit imperfect information by charging 
noncompetitive prices as well as by offering less than ideal warr11nty 
coverage, a�d that the former practice may be more 1erioua in m11ny 
markets than the latter • 
CONSUMER HARIIITS FOR WARRANTIES 
Alan Schwartz• and Louis L. Wilde•• 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A warranty is an insurance policy that sellers offer against 
praduct related harms, In tho last two decades, this insurnnce 
� 
increasingly has been mndo compuhoryt sellers have boon required to 
warrant concerning-.!.�. to insure buyers against-various purchase 
risks. A related form of regulation requires sellers to give 
unusually clear explanations of contract terms relating to warranty 
coverage, in contrast to the explanations roquirlld of other contract 
terms, As examples of these rules: (a) Sellers cnnnot disclaim 
warranties or limit tho remedies that would otherwise be available to 
buyers in the event warranties aro breached if thll product caused n 
1 i j i Thus firms arc required to insure buyer to incur persona n ur ea, 
buyers against snch injuries; (b) Courts road promises to repair or 
roplace defective pnrts of consumer durables as guarantees of perfect 
f th d bl th Selves As One court recently performance o o ura os cm , 
o:xpl ained: 
When tho seller is given re11sonable opportunity to correct the 
defect or defects, and the vehicle nevertheless fails to operate 
as should a new vohiclo free of defects, tho limited remedy [tho 
promise to repair or replace parts] fails of its essential 
purpose. • , 1110 buyer may then invoke 11ny of tho remedies 
available under tho Uniform Comm1>rcia1 Code, including UH 'l ,,·\ t 
of the goods. 1 to tevokc acceptance . . . .
In consequence of this rul c, tho buy or is allowed to recovllr bn"t. the
("rovokc acceptance") 11nd to be compenutod for any dnmagot incu1 r�tl, 
I 
pd co 
including the cost of renting another item when the product he \ought�•• bclnR 
serviced; (c) Tho Magnuson-Moss Warranty and Federal Tro.de Comm} �don 
I 
Improvement Act requires firms to "fully and conspicuously discJ.os�· in 
simple an� readily understood langu11ge tho terms and conditionrc'' of con�umc:r 
' 2 product warranties, This atatutll also provorits sellorn from d:! sclaiming 
implied wnrrnnties if they have made written warranties respecting tho 
., 3 i ' products at issue. Tho prohibition is meant to ncreaso wnrrn"•Y 
I , 
coverage since implied warranties shift most purchase risks to "oHera, and 
written wartnnties arc commonly offered in connection with 81\lcs ot durable 
i ! 
goods; thoy usually oblignto firms to repnir or replace dofocti'·.'" par·ts, 
All: of this :cegulation is often ju·atificd on the g:cound tl>�t 
tho prese c� of "imperfect information" would otherwise cnablo firms 
to exploit consumers rcspect�ng warranty cover11ge, but the rog11l1•tlon 
actually precedcd serious investigation of how imperfect inform�tion 
could affect warranty markets. Two di sti net forms of imperfect 
information,might disadvantage consumers respectin·g war:cnnties. 
First, coisu�ers may be unaware of true product failure probabi' '.\OS 
bocanse i't is quite expensive to observe product attributes ful iy, If 
perceive
,
d ,failure probabilities differ from actual ones, cons11�1 rs may 
demand mor� :or loss warranty coverage than they actually wnnt.
Second, consumers mny be unaware of tho full sot'of possible waccal'ty 
3 
prices and terms that the market could offer because they.may perceive 
the costs of searching for desirable contracts to bo high in relation 
to the gains, H conswnors actually ong11go in little search, firms 
may havo an incentive to offer loss advantageous warranty covorago 
than better informed consumers would choose. 
The regulation described above did not distinguish between 
these information concerns; inl\tcad, in the words of tho Magnuson-Moss 
ii\ 
Act, it sought "to improve the adequacy of information available to 
qonaumcrs, prevent deception, and improve competition • , • ,114 The 
few pnpcra that constitute the relevant economics literature, in 
contrast, focus almost cxclu�ivcly on the aunmed inability of 
consumers to observe failure probabilities accurately (�·A• Corvillc 
and Hansman; Shapiro), These papers suppose that (i) this inability 
exists; '(ii) search costs aro zero or ( iii) the seller i& a 
monopolist, in which case search costs are irrelevant (sec also 
Grossman), They then attempt to explain and predict 11arranty content, 
As we show below, omitting search costs from an analysis of warranties 
may yield seriously misleading oonclu�ions. Renee, it is important to 
ask ho11 11arr11nty markets perform in the presoncc of costly search, 
This paper represents the beginning of an attempt to answer this 
question, 
We suppose e market for a product 11ith an exogenous 
probability (n) of breaking and becoming usele.ss; n is known to all. 
Firms can offer tho good with a warranty or without one, but cannot do 
both, Consumers have prof oroncos respecting warrnnty coverage, bot do 
4 
not �ow, when thoy bogin to search, 11hioh fit-'lllil offor th" �u0c\ :rHh a 
11arran. and· which qrms 1101 1  without one. Using these r 1 ... 1•uiptlon�, 
11e charocterizo nocoasary and s ufficient conditions for oxi <t1rn.oe of 
the various equilibria that could arise in t110 paradigm cnr,.·.:;·, r.hen 
'· 
all consumers profor 110.rrnnties 11nd when none do, In tho fotmtlr c11ze, 
I 
if enough consumors s hop for warranty coverage, firms wi1 J 0U0r: 
I: 
1111rr11nties 11t competitive prices, Shonld··fewer conswnou tL.'.11 this 
i. 
shop, firms will provide 11arranties at supracompotitivo p.dces if. th�y 
, ' I 
have a comparative advantage (appropriately defined) at fit'.1.ll.ng with 
warranties, When tho comparative advantage rung tho other ·;rn,-.,, f'i=s 
I 
will charge supracompotitive prices nnd deteriorate warrnuly aovcrago. 
Thi' last outcome is less likely to occur if consumers Hxongly rrofcr 
1; 
warranties, When consumers do not prefer wArrantios 11t Rl 1--tho 
second case--it turns out that warranties will never be o�fcrod; if 
eno:ngh1 consumers comparison shop, a competitive cquilibl'i •.:a oi:curs; 
othenrise, prices are too high, Also, these results nppJ:. t.o 
"quality" problems generally. A warranty is,. in II formnl :<enso, only 
i 
a rion�prico product featriro; honco, our conclusions ·can hn co�sidorod 
I +! 
to ipply in 11ny case in which "product quality" ,ls a non··pricn 
• 
f ea tu;i:-e over which consumers havo homogeneous pref eronco s. 1110 
imp�ications of this interpretation are di1ou1sed in Part �. 
Part 2 of this paper briefly reviews tho oxhtin� l Hcutur.e 
respe.cting warrnnties, focusing primarily on ih utility for policy 
purposes, Pa rt 3 thon sots forth our model. P11rt 4 info, :onlly 
speculatos nbout th6 consoquonces of relaxing some of the Jnrorlnnt 
,!) .ii 
5 
assumptions on which the modol rests, and briefly discussos tho policy 
significanoo of our rosults, Respecting this, if it is supposed that 
regulation on information grounds ig justified only whon 
noncompotitivo equilibria exist, then an important question is how 
competitive equilibria can be produced, Onr mo.dcl suggests that those 
equilibria arc largely a function of tho ll!llOunt of comparison shopping 
in which consumers engage; hona\i, reducing tho costs to consumers of
comparing warranty coverage across firms seems wise, Also, the 
existence of imperfect information is commonly assumed to permit firms 
to exploit consumorR by offering less preferred warranty coverage, 
Our resnl ta suggest that firms will also exploit consumers by charging 
excessive prices, and that pricing problOllls mny bo more serious in 
some markets than coverage problems, Somo of tho regulation described 
above socks only to expand coverage and thus may ho misconceived, 
Given tho very preliminary nature of our analysis, those normative 
implications should ho regarded more as interesting possibilities than 
as solid recommendations, 
2, PRESENT WARRANTY THEORIES 
Two theories constitute mnch of tho literature respecting 
warrantios. Tho first providos that a warranty signals tho quality of 
tho firm's product. (� • .a. .. Grossman; Sponce), According to this 
thoory, consumors cannot distinguish ll!l1ong competing products on tho 
basis of quality, but believe that quality is positively correlated 
with warranty coverage, Also, the cost to firms of making warrantios 
ahould vttry invonoly with product quality; the worse tho product is, 
6 
tho moro oxponsivo lt will be to comply with warranties mc:a 
respecting it. In consequence of theso assumptions, warr��ty covortgb 
should in fact correlate positively with product quality, Firms with 
g�od products will make extensive warranties that algnnl t�ls fact, 
and firms with poor products will bc. unable to imitate th' ',O :<ignals. 
Tho signalling theory has three related diffieultios, First, 
the theory presupposes a great doal of search, since firmn hnvo no 
incentive to send signals that will not be observed, Porl1�pn in
consequence of this assumption, Bignalling papers ,commonly �uppose 
search costs to bo zero, Ylo later suggest that the 1trot1t,�.h "f thh 
assumpt.ion may portly explain the socond illffioulty with t' � 
signalling theory, which is that it sooma inconsistent -;;itii i.l·� dati\, 
For example, tho theory predicts that firms wlth more durr \1 o p1·oducts 
will �ake warranties that extend over longer time periods, �tudiea of 
reported legal coses and of actual warranties, in contrnst, nhow that 
firms in given industries commonly make warrant! cs off oct h· 'l for 
identical periods, nnd in all events for considerably las• th�n tho 
useful life of tho p;oduct, (�·K•• Priest), Similarly, n po1ltiv6 
correlation botw.con warranty coverage and prod.net 'rellabll Hy �fton 
aooma difficult to detect, Thus, frequency of repair dn t• Pich 11n 
that reported in Consumer Reports, somctimos shows wide Vb · J" t ionl 
among firms, but tho. products thomsolvos trade undor simll r.r or 
identiclll warranties, Finally, many commercial buyers, pn,·tl (ltla:Hy 
in industrial markets, soom ablo to distinguish among pro<'.ct.r, on tho
basis of quality, yet wnrrantics are as common in commorcJ.-,; .·,�rkots 
7 
a& in conaumor markets (Schwartz, 1977), Third, signalling 
explanations lend themselves uneasily to policy application, This is 
initially becanso signRlling equilibria are notoriously unstable, s� 
that it is difficult to derive from them criteria that would enable 
dccisiorunakera to ovnluato real world markets. (�·A•• Schwartz, 1981;
Riley), Also, tho wolfaro effects of signalling equilibria are very 
� 
hard to ovaluate, Such equilibria, when they exist, reflect only tho 
sustained confirmation of a party's beliefs. Thus if consumers 
believe warranty coverage to correlate positively with product 
durability and if gollors with more durable products incur lower costs 
in making warranties than do sellers with loss durable products, the 
former sellers have an incentive to make moro extensive warranties, 
If they actually do so, a signalling equilibrium might arise in which 
warranty coverage varies ·directly with durability; in this ovont, the 
informational content that consumers attribute to tho warranty signn1 
is confirmod by tho signals they see. This equilibrium would be
efficient, ho�ever, only if the increased costs to firms of sending
such warranty aignals are less than tho welfare gains to consumers of 
being able to distiugnish more accurately Blilong products on tho basis 
of durability. This comparison is very difficult to make, 
The second warranty theory explains coverage by rofcrenco to 
the comparative advantages ot firms and consumers in reducing the 
costs of or insuring against product defects, For oxamplo, firms will 
warrftnt against defocts in refrigerator motors but will bo reluctant 




against such dofocts for shorter timo periods, This Is h0��n2a 
8 
consumers have little expertiso respecting th.o· care of ,uc:•. motors and 
indeed seldom directly uso them, while co
,
nsnmers can best .Influence 
tho durability of doors, Thoto plainly is a oore of truth ln this
theory, and it explai,ns some of what 16 observod·. Commercial Jaw, u 
an illustration, docs not require firms to repair or roplaco 1.lofoctivo
parts; instead, it gives buyers an action for ,tho 1lamagoi '1rnt 11nch
defects could cnuse, Firms, however, frequently do mako r�rab: and 
replacement promises, apparently because it is moro effid '•1t for thorn 
rather than consumers to cure· dofocts in now goods,· 
Tho comparative advantage theory, as it is usually P�t f'orth,
also assumes search costs to bo zero, and this croates two 
difficul tie�. First ifi 
' 
, suppose one spec es tho rospoctivo «omp1trativn 
advantages of consumers and firms, predicts warranty oontont on the 
basis of these advnntagos, and thon observes that actual covor:1go is 
too thin, The theory is not necessarily disconfirmed bec�n: e,. u t10 
sh-0w below, ll'hen firms would do bettor by not making w11rr11n•.ln than 
by making them when little search ocours, oovorago may be 
deteriorated, oven though firms have a comparative 11rlvant,1r, 0\'01' 
consumers at insuring against or preventing product defoctb, Socond, 
suppose one observes the predicted coverage; Tho positive "'pnot of
the theory then 500018 confirmed, but itl normative implicnt:.or« romdU 
uncertain. This is because if consumers engage in inaufHc. ,int 
search, firms mny be offering tho "right" warranties but ll� 
supracompoti tive prices. Tho oompnrative advantage theory t.h111, r.hoal<l 
i· 
bo evaluated in onvironmonts whore information is costly to acquire, 
Section 3 sots out a model that boglns this task, 
3, A MODEL OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
Suppose that (i) largo numbers of firms and consumers exist; 
(ii) a homogonoous good is sold, with consumers buying one unit of 
this good (with or without a warranty) or none;5 (iii) the good has a 
positive probability, n, of b !oaking and becoming totally usoloss 
9 
after purchase; IT is independent of the care with which t'he product is 
6 used, nnd known both to firms and consumers; (iv) all firms produce 
this good with an idontical technology, characterized by a fixed cost, 
F, a constant marginal cost, c, over some range [0, s], and an infinite 
marginal cost thoronfter (1 will thus be referred to as a "cnpncity 
constraint"); (v) firms choose a quantity to produce and n price to 
charge, and can offer tho good with a warranty or without, but cannot 
do both; a warranty, in this model, consists of a promise to replace 
any defective product with a new ono at no charge; (vi) offering the 
product with a warranty does not di rectly affect firms' marginal costs 
or the capacity constraint, but may require additional fixed costs, 
F', where F' 2 0, These additional fixed costs may result from 
administrative or other expenses that a replacement program could 
cause; when F' ) O, we say that a warranty imposes "loading" costs on 
the firm, 
A firm tlu1t does not offer warranties can produce and sell up 
to s units in any period, and faces a total cost curve given by 
T�(x) e F + ex whero 0 i x i a, Avorngo costs thus arc 
!11 
!'. 10 
A�(xi .. c + CF/x ) foi.- 0 � x .S. a; tho 11co111pot.Hivo pdc�" fo� the good 
with . .!!.Q warrnnty is. then dofinod by p� 11 A�(s ) .. c + (f/f.), A firm 
that offers wnrrnntios must plan for tho replacement of d�f:�r.tivo 
goods when it decides how many tJnits to sell (a$ opposed to how Mar:y 
units to produce), Since ropl11coments also can bo defectlvo, tho 
� 
expected quantity that must bo produced to ".support" a snJ c of one 
unit is 1/(1 - n), Thus the total cost curve for 11 .firm '.hat sells 
with a warranty h T<;v(x ) = (F + F') + [c x/(1 - n)], wherr P' h the
loading factor; This total cost curve is defined.for 
0 �xi s(l - IT) = sW' Avernge costs thus a re 
A<;v(x ) = { (F + F') + [ex/Cl - n) J) /x 
= [c/(1 - n)] + [(F + F')/xl 
for 0 � x .S. sW , and the "competi tivo price" for the goo,i �'..,.l.Jl! II 
warranty is defined by 
[c/(1 IT)) + [(F + F')/s(i - 11)] 
= [ 1/ ( 1 - IT)] [ c + ( F + F' ) Is 1 
As this equation mates clear� tho effective marginal co•t for tho good 
with a warranty is ow a c/(1 - IT). 
Consumers in this model n1·e pa rtitioned in two dhti;1ct 11�ys. 
First, they pursue n fixed sample size shopping strategy, �lth AJ 
consumers sampling ono firm at random (from among a·ll fJ.1.<'.s) befor11 
purchasing, 11nd A2 consumers sampling two firms at rnn!lom (fi:om among 
!.11 firms) before pnrchasing,7 Define A=�+ Az• 111 =Ai/A and
a2 = "z/A. Consumers sample at random across firms because thoy do 
not know, when they begin to search, which firms soll with.and which 
11 
without warranties, Socond, consumers aro potentially differontiatod 
according to their "taste" for warranties, A consumer's taste for a 
warranty can be a function of prioes, income, attitude toward risk, 
perception of and ability to �ffect failure probabilities and so 
forth, Part 3A of this paper models the case when all consumers are 
sufficiently risk averse to prefer the product with a warranty, if 
they have tho op portunity to purchase the product with or without a 
warranty, but always at tho competitive price. This case is
considered for two reasons: First, decisionmakors gonorally assume
that consumers pref or warranty protection; it thus is useful to see
how warranty mnrkets work under this assumption. Second, an important 
reason why consumers might prefer not to buy irnrranties is that in 
some cases consumers have a comparative advantage nt reducing failuro 
probabilities; this reason is absent hero, for we assume that 
consumers cannot influence the failure probability, Part 3B next 
considers the case when no consumer prefers a warranty. A warranty is 
in essence nn insurance policy against product failure that the seller 
offers; in tho situations that Part 3B explores, consumers prefer 
other goods to seller insurance. Because the 111odol described hero 
applies to any pnir of heterogeneous goods, a moro concrete way to 
interprot this second c11se follows from current lnw, which permits 
firms to descrlbc extensive warranties as " ful l" but roq tiires them to 
dcscdbo less o:de_nsivo waruntios as "Hr:iitod,"
8 Thl� 
thns can bo concoivod as modeling· a market in which 111l ,;o; ;;vmot"� 
pref or limited warranties, al though .tho techno1ogn pornd t� fitms to ' 
off�t full warrnntios, In both casos considorod, each consnmor ia 
i' 
asr;umod to have a willingness to pay for tho good with " �··•1rrant7, l>...,�· 
and n different willingness to pay for tho good without a ••rranty, 
hN; 'tho former ·willingness to pay is ahnys higher th1111 th-0 lattor.9 
Iii part 3A, whor.o all oonsnmors profer warranties, wo 11.J rn •·eqniro 
. "' hw - Pw > hN - pN; that is, tho surplus generated by pnrcb:1�ing tho 
• 
good _with n warranty at Pw exceeds tho surplus obtained '·'· purchasing 
• 
th_e good without a warranty at pN' 
We lot NN be tho number of firms that offot tho �ootl ·.d th ont � 
warranty and NW be tho number of finns that offor tho goc"l with a 
wArra.nty; N"' NN + �· � = NN/N nnd nw = �/N. · F.quil!bdnm in thh 
model is then defined by a totnl consumer/firm ratio, a "' A/N, 11 
distribution of firms, (�, nw>, and two .distribution� of p• l ces , one 
for tho good with a warranty and one for tho good with out n warrattty, 
such: that (11) 1111 consumers m11xi111izc their surplus givon thoir. 
sbop�ing strategy, (b) given tho distribution of firms r•1Hl pricoa, hl 1 
firm,s e arn zero expected profits (ontry is f.ree), and· (d <en firm can 
earn positive expected profits by changing ib price Ol' 'll'i.Ullnt.}' 
oov�rnge. 
A. bll Consumers Prefer Wnrrnntlos 
In t h is model, two markets roust be cont! dero<l , I h,, mad:ei fo;· 
the good wl th n wnrrnnty nnd tho mnrkot for tho good ,,. J tho•:t on·o. 
I •J 
Each mntket can bo nonexistent, competitive or noncompetitive, This 
yields nino possible outcome$, Ruling out tho outcome when neither 
market exists, eight possibilities romain. We noxt prosont three 
theorems that summarize those possibilities in terms of whether tho 
equilibrium is competitive or not, and whothor imperfect information 
is exploited by noncompetitive pricing or poor warranty coverage (or 
both), 
(a) All firms offer tho product with a warranty at the 
competitive price; no firm offers tho product without 
a wnrranty at any price, 
When all consumers pref er warranties, the only possible 
competitive equilibrium occurs whon tho relevant product is sold with 
a warranty at tho oompotitivo price -- case 3A(a), This equilibrium 
will obtain only lf tho ratio of shoppers to total consumers in tho 
markot at issuo is sufficiontly high. Before prosonting tho theorem 
that proves this r esult, it will be helpful to define what we moan by. 
tho "comparative advantage"· to firms of offering a product with or 
13 
without a warranty, We define a comparative advantage by reference to 
tho number of customers that a firm offering tho product at the 
highest price consumers would be willing to pay would need to break 
oven: If a firm, as a result of its cost structure and consumer 
proforoncos, would need fowor customers to break even offering the 
product at its highest price with a warranty than it would need 
off or i ng tho product without a warranty, wo then say that in this 
pnrticulnr mnrlo t firms have 11 comparative advnntage at sell lng with 
warranties, Similarly,· if a firm woul
_
d neod fowor cu�t.rw1 ?n. 11t t)il) 
break even point whon offering tho ptodt1ct at its his,he..r: rdcc 
without II warranty, thcin we say that firms have .11 compa.retivo 
advantage at selling without warra.ntios, The rolov 11 11 t br�<tl-cvon 
.demand for Ii firm of selling with'warranties is:' 
The relevant bronk-oven demand for n firm of selling ·d (;""'l 
warranties is: 
°N e  F/(� - c), 
The relative sizes of «w and °N dot�rmine oompnrative �<)•rnntago. 
Theorem 1 :  When all consumers prefer warrant l o ?. , � - necossl'ry 
· and sufficiont condition for "N = 0. nw = 1, a = SW' nnd 
• 
for P < Pw 
for 
to be an equilibrium, whore GW( ' ) is the distribution of p:icei in tho 
markot for tho good with a warranty, is a1aW �min{�,�}. 
Proof of Tl1eorem 1 :  When tho market for ·tho product wl.!11 11 "' ll rra nty is 
competitive' and n... O t d d d t • t ' N = , oxpoc o em an a Pw mus eq nr. ·' 
.firms entor until O' e A/N = sf!" Consider whether a firm in the r.iar>.d 
.for tho product with a wnrranty would find lt profltabh • ... r.�ht• f.t� 
• 
price above Pw· Snch a firm ghould charge hw• t'ho high· .d ndco t1 
consumer would pny, since it could sell only to nonshop1·ci ·; 11ny 
• 
shopper who seos two prices, Pw and any prlco 11bove th!s, 1rnuld buy al; 
.. 
Pw· Tho potent! al deviant firm then would not raise ita price 
. profits at hw wer o nonpositivc; that is, if (A1/N)(hw - cw > -
(F + F') � o. Ronrranging terms yields CA1/N) � (F +F') /<hw -
aw• Using A/N = �W' this condition reduces to a1sw � aw•
1S 
if 
cw > = 
Suppose next that a firm wished to· enter the market and offer 
the p1'odnct without a warranty, Sinco all oonsnmors prefer warranties 
• 
when warranties llre offered at�their competitive price, Pw• this firm 
too would sell only to nonshoppers regardless of the price it charged, 
Hence, it should charge hN ' tho highest price a consumer wou�d pny for 
·the product without a warranty, Once more, profits at this price 
wonld bo nonposi tivc if 111 sW .S. �· Q,E,D. 
Thoorom 1 i! tho more likely to be satisfied the larger is tho 
ratio of shoppers to total consumers (a2), tho smaller is capacity 
(sW)' tho larger are fixed costs and tho smaller is the difference 
between consumers willingness to pay for tho product (with or without 
a warranty) and the marginal cost of producing it, The latter two 
conditions ref or to nw and °N' whose magnitudes increase 11 ith 
increases in fixed cost and decreases in the differonco botweon 
willingness to pay and marginal coat, 
(b) All firms offer tho product with a warranty, but
some or all firms charge noncompetitive prices; 
noncompetitive prices; no firm offers the product 
without a warranty. 
Caso 3A(h) occurs when too fow shopper.s exist to generate a 




selling with 17arranties (aw < °N), In thh oironmgtanco, nll\1: H powM 
arising. frQm insufficient consumer shopping is exploited onty through 
nonoompeti tive pricing, 1!Q.! by such pricing and by doter.!1•.1 •.:::. ng 
warranty coverage; consumers will get the warrantio� they unnt, but 
will pay too much for them, 
Theorem 2 :  When 1111 .consumers prefer warranties, 11 ·noocssnry iind . 
sufficient condition for �= o, nw = 1, CJ .. aw/ al .and 
ow<P> == o • for p ( Pw
• 
0 < GW(p) ( 1 for Pw i p 
< hw 
GY/( P) "' 1 for hw � p 
Proof of Thcororo 2: When � "'·o, tho highest price in a 1101100,)I'�tiUve 
equilibrium in the market for the good with II :r1nrranty munl be hW' 
ainco the firm charging th.e highest price gets only nonshoppon, 
profits then implies CA1/Nl<bw- ow) -
·(F + F'l = 0 or a "'  "'w/nl.
. � 
Zoro 
Considox GW( ')., Suppose it hns a mass point at Pw• _cal loci G,-· Thon 
expected demand at p; oqunls A1/N (the firm' a shar� of nonshopvors) 
. , . ' 
pins (2/N)A2[(1/2)GW + (1 - GW)J (tho firm's share of shoJlrrri-),· Z;iro 
• ·
profits at Pw implies 
• 
C<Ai/N) + (2/NlAzCC1/2)GW + (1 (F + F') 
'* I • Solving for GW and noting that (F + F') (pW - cW) = 'W 
. * Thna GW < 1 requires 
which r.oduce s to aw < a1 'w· 
We must also consider whether a firm would enter tho market 
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for tho good 1dthout 11 warranty, To cnlcuhto profits in thnt market,, 
it is nocossary to know the explµ.cit form of tho price distribution, 
• • GW( ) , on (p w•hwl, Expected profits at price p are 
Zero profits then gives 
Supposo next that a firm enters the market for the good without a 
warranty at a price q. To calculate the expected demand for the firm 
at this price, we first note that the expected demand from nonshoppers 
is \/N.
I 
Respecting shoppers, consider a price q for the product · 
with a warranty, such that hN - q 
= hw - q'; that is, the surplus to a 
consumer of buying with a warranty at q' is equal to the surplus 
obtained by buying without a warranty at q, A shoppor then will 
purchase from the firm selling without a warranty at p = q only .if his 
or her other obgorvntion is at p > q' ( recall that all other firms 
soll with warranties). Tho probability that tho consumer' s  other 
observation is p > q' is 1 - GW( q') = 1-(hw - � + q), A firm that 
ontors without a warranty at price q thus has 11n oxpectod demnnd from 




11N(q) . ·= {(A1/N> + (2/N)A2(1 - Gw<1if - � + q)]) (q - c) · •. F 
f(F + F')(q - c)/(hw - � + q - c)] - F, 
whence 
I 2 11N(q) = (F + F')(1if - �)/(h.w - � + q - c) > o, 
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Because profits for n finn entering without a war:"nnty 11ro '•nc:i:es.�ing 
in q, entry would not occur if 11N(�) � 0, Dnt 
Q,E,D, 
· , Theorem 2 stntos that when connumers prefer warrnn: i .o� 
imperfect information will be exploited by noncompetitive pddng in
tho market for tho product with a warranty (!.�·· thnr� is no coverage 
problem) if and only if the propoition �f nonshoppers is rcl�livoly 
high (a\','� a1 s1,.> and finns have a coraparativo advantage nt offtdnc: 
the �roduct with a warranty (aw< �f),
(c) Some (possibly .!!.ll) firms offor tho produr.t 
without a warranty and at noncompetitivo prices. 
T his ca so occurs when too fo'ff consumers shop to gen'"tn !;o « 
competl tive equilibrium and firms have a comparativo adv11ntngo r.t 
selling without warranties, If few (!uough consumers shop, · i U.rins 
offer the product without a warranty and at noncompctitivo r 'c�s, 
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Case 3A(c) is the least desirable nonnativoly, for consUZ11era who 
prefer warranties often fail to got them and in addition pay too much 
for tho product. This case is leas likely to arise if a fair numbor 
of con&tllllors shop; should enough shopping occur, then even though 
firms have a comparative advantage at selling without warranties, at 
least &ome firms will be induced to offer the product with a warranty, 
although not at tho competitive prico, 
Th¢orom 3: When all consumers prefer warrantios, a noccssary and 
sufficient condition for 0 < °N < 1, 0 � nw < 1, C1 = °N/n1· 
and 
GN(p) "' 0 
0 � GN(p) ( 1 
GN(p) = 1 
a.,,CPl = o 
0 .{ GW(p) � 0 








p ( Pw 
• 
Pw i p ( hw 
hw � P 
to bo an equilibrium,- where Gw(')[GN(")] is the distribution of pricos 
in the market for the good with [without] a warranty, is 
� S mln{«vi,alsWJ, 
( i) 
(ii) 
Furthermore, n, = 0 if and only if 
a1sW) (a1 + 2a2)°N 
kw� aiF'/(al + 2a2)°N 
where 1w = <Iiw - ow) - (hN - c) , 
(Tho proof of Thoorom 3 is complex, and is set forth in Appendix 1.) 
To summ11.dze the implications of thoao th.roo t)\"'·'":'"ti when 
all consumers prof or warranties, the only posliblo_ compr ,_! Hv" 
Oquil ibri um Occurs when the rel OV!\Dt product lg 301 d W J.: .'· ;, ll'IU'rllnty 
at tho competitivo price, Whether this equilibrium nc"Lt:�l.'y 11111 
occur is solely n function of the percentage of shoppe ti h2) in the 
marlot at issue; if a2 is sufficiently luge,. 
on ly wuz".:1tlt1:t at 
competi tivo prices arc offered (Theorem· 1), If a2. is to·-, �mdl tc; 
· a compotitivo equilibrium, but firms havo a .compar11.t!vo 
advanhge at sol ling with warrantioll <«w ( °N)" comumort r.a�in so11 
only warranties, but at noncompetitive prices (Theorem 2). Should 
firms have a comparative advantnge at sollins without ., , ..  ,_ 111tio&, thoy 
will both dotoriorato warranty covorngo and chargo noncompet1tive 
prices. Indeed, if the number of shoppers in this onso .Ir, 
stifficiontly small, the· market for warranties will diu.1•re.·.r 
al together; consumers aoo only goods sold without warranU.oi nnd at 
supracompetititvo prices (Theorem 3)_, 
Tho casos th11t Theorem 3 models are .tho leut d�5ln1blo 
normatively. Tho worst case, when no warr�ntles are �ocn although all 
consumers pref or th om, is 1 ess 1 ikaly to ari !II' if' a fail number of 
oonstllllers shop, If fowor oon111mers than this ahop, fi.rn& havo 
incentives to exploit them by deteriorating warranty coror�gc .nnd by 
charging monopoly_ prices. Should firms have 11 compar11tJ.·«o r1dvant1qp, 
u defined hero, at selling with warranties 11t tho monq;oly rrice, 
they would never have an incaotl·1e also to detcriorato '>'Htnnty 
coverage; 'fh·eorem 3 cannot apply. Tho ·approprlnte comp;· "tivo 
advantage obtnins whon (1) it costs little more to soll with
warranties than without them (F' = 0 or is small), and (2) consumers 
strongly prefer warranties. Respecting tho rationale for these 
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conditions, if consumers strongly prefer warranfles, tho highest price 
they would bo willing to pay for tho good with a wnrranty Ghould 
significantly exceed tho highest price they would be.willing to pny 
for the good without a warranty� honco, a firm offering the good at 
its highest price would need fewer customers to break even when 
selling with warranties than when selling without them, unloss it. 
costs considornbly more to make a warranty. Condition (1) ruloa this 
possibility out. Our model therefore yields tho seemingly sensible 
r�sult that warranties will be more common whon thoy cost relatively
little to make and aro strongly preferred, even in environments 
10characterized by considerable imperfect information. 
D, No Consumers Prefer Warranties
This case can be described more quickly; Lot lw be tho
consumers' willingness to pay for tho good with a warranty and lN be 
the consumers' willingness to pay for the good without a warranty. 
Also, •e again define the "comparative advantage" to firms
. 
of selling
with and withont warranties in terms of willingness to pay and costs, 
llere �N is tho comparative advantage of selling without warranties:
Similarly, �W is the comparative advantage at selling with
'll'arrantios: 
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�w = (F + F' >/Ow - cw>.
Theorom 4. Whon no consumers prefer warrnnties and onongli 
consumers comparison shop, a competitive equilibr{um oan oc·:.Ir in 
which. all firms soll without warranties and all prices a.ro 
competitive. Tiio necessary and sufficient conditions for tld � ontoome
to obtain arc: 
Cl) r.1 � PN/s 
(ii) a1 � Pwfsw· 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
" 
If all firms charge tho competitive price pN' 11 fir>·l dshing 
to deyiatc but not offer warranties will charge lN because It �ells 
• 
only to nonshoppers. Also, with all firms charging pN' the· �1>.isnmer
firm ratio, "' must equal s. Then, for a deviation from thr 
competitive price to yield nonpositive profits, it must bn !h�t 
111 s(1N - c) - F i O. This roduccli to 111 � PN/s, If a firm d.sbos 
instead to dovinto by offering a warnnty, it '!fill eha
_
rgc 1\1" · !noe 
again it gets only nonshoppors, For this strategy to yield 
Wl1othor or not the competitiv.o equillbrinCTt jnst dc�cr(l;oJ is 
• 
unique depends on·whethor or not lw - Pw is greatoi: or lop \!u\n 
• lN - pN' To understand tho relevance of this condition, r .: .. l l that 
if too fow shoppers exl.st to generate 11 competitivo oquil ib l """ tho 
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question ia whether finna will exploit consumers by charging 
anpracompetitivo prices or by both charging those prices and offering 
unwanted warranty coverage. ll'hich outcome occurs is a function of the 
relationship bohreon the consumers' willingness to pny for a warranty 
and tho oxpocted marginal cost to firms of offering warranty coverage� 
A consumer's willingness to pay for a warranty mny be conceptualized 
� 
as tho difforonoc between tho highest prico that a consumer is willing 
to pay for tho good with a warranty and the highest price that the 
consnmor is willing to pay for the good without one, If this 
willingness to pay for warranty protection is less than the marginal 
cost to firms of offering warranties, it conld never be profitable ,for 
a firm to force un'!fanted coverage on consumers. Imperfect inf.ormation 
could be exploited only through charging excessive prices, 
In our model, consumers buy one unit or none and firms sell up 
to a oapnci ty constraint. These assumptions yield "atop function" 
demand curves and nondifferontiablc average cost curves. llonco it is 
possible, within tho model, for the consumers' willingness to pny for 
warranty protection to exceed the marginal cost of providing 
'!fnrranties, oven though all consumers when facing only competitive 
prices would eshow warranty protection, Appendix II chnrncterizes the 
various equilibria that conld arise in this event. If we make the 
more typical assumption that firms have differentiable, u-shaped 
average cost curves, it tnrns out th11t consumers wonld nover be 
willing to pay for warranty protection when they do not prefer 
we.rrantlos, To ioo why, realize that the case whon consumers would be 
fillwilling to pny for warranty protection occurs when 
With "normal" cost curves, pd co oqnal a 111arginal coat in c"'"potlti"Te 
., • 
oqnil ibri nm: cw 
"' pW; ON .. Pw Ronco, we have 
• • 1, - lN < Pw Pw 
The left side of·thia inequality is the 'ldllingneu to pay fq· 
warranty coverage; tho right tido h the p.remium a firm will "·1 nr,o 
for offering a warranty when tho product ii sold with an� 'l".'i'.hcint 
warranties bnt at the _respective competitive prices. Thll !iwq1·�lity 
necessarily hol�s, bccanao we have defined tho preference n��•�•t 
warranties in to1"111s of the refnaal of coniurilor.s to pay tho .rr�iuro for 
warranty coverngo that the market must charge when all p�ice1 nra 
competitive. Henoo, nndcr more realistic a11nmption1 roeper.tl!q\ 
o.oata , when consumers 'do not prefer waq:1ntie1, fims hnvc IH' 
incentive to offer thom; warranties wonld not 1011. If an 
inanffioient nnmbor of consumers comparison shop to generate � , 
oompotitive oquilibrinm, prio111 will bo noncompetitive but (1r>n1.nmcrs 
wil 1 1et the contract terms they prefer. Thil l 111t cuo. oc • •n: .• when 
11 > pN/s (see lnoorom 4 ( i)), 
4. £xtcn1iona, Implic•tions and Limltntiona 
' 
A. Podtivo F�on! 
25 
The l!l O d o l  d ev e l oped h e r e  i s  i nt erpr etabl e i n  " pure" qno. l i ty 
term s .  Suppo se th a t  a h e t ero g e no ous good i s  s o l d  that h d e s c r i b e d  l:ly 
pr l c o  and aomo non·-prioe qual i ty a ttribut e r o s p o c t i ng whi ch al l 
conaum o r &  p r e f er h i gh e r  l evel & ,  Let tho h i gh qua l i ty v e r s i o n  o f  th i s  
produ c t  b e  produ c e d  w i th greater f ixe d co s t s ,  no l e s s o r  m a r g i na l  co s t s
a nd a smal l er f i rm capa c i ty than t h o  l ow qnn l i ty version,  Th on, the 
m arke t can s uppo r t  a n  i no f f i c\ ent qua l i ty l evel i f  but only i f  ( i) a n  
i n suf f i c i ent number o f  oon&nm e r s  shop t o  g e ne r a t e  11 comp e t i t iv e  
equ i l ibr i um  i n  th o marke t  f or th o h i gh qua l i ty product and ( i i )  f i rm s
h av e  a compa rative a dv ant a g e ,  a s  d e f ined abov e ,  i n  produc i n g  l ow 
q nn l i ty goods , If the comp a r a t i v e  a dvant a g e  run s  th o other w ny, f i rm s
a ga i n  e xpl o i t  imperf ect i nform a t i on only by noncomp e t i t i v e  p r i c i ng i n  
th o h J. gh q ua l i ty marke t ,  
Al so,  our m odel rul e s  out s i gna l l ing,  for i t  i s  p o i nt l e s s  o f  
f i rm s  t o  s e nd qua l i ty s i gna l s  w h e n  a l l  consum e r s  h a v e  p e r f e c t  
i nform a t i on r e sp e c t i ng qn11 1 i ty ;  the consum e r s ,  th nt i s , know n ,  the 
f a i l ur e  proba b i l i ty .  Nov e r th e l o s s ,  the mod e l  sheds som o l ight on 
s i gna l l ing thoor i o s ,  I t  shows t h a t  when consum e r s  have p e r f e c t  
qua l i ty inform a t i o n  a n d  unanimou s ly p r e f e r  w arrant i e s ,  equi l ibr i a  c a n  
exi st i n  which f ow or n o  warrant i e s  arc of f er e d ,  Thi s  impl i e s  t h n t  
i nsuf f i c i ent con s nm or s e a rch reduc e s  t h o  i nc e nt i v e  of f irm s t o  us o 
w arrant i e s  t o  conv ey inform a t i on about product q ua l i ty .  Thu s ,  
s i gna l l ing e q ua l i b r i a  aro unl ikely to om orgo un l e s s  consum e r s po s s e s s  
oons i d o r abl e i nform a t i on about pri c e s  a nd contr act t o rm a ,  Th e  f a i l u r e  
of s i gn a l l ing m o do l a  t o  r o cogn i z o  th i s  f a ct may pa rtly o xpl n i n t h e i r
inco n s h t o ucy w l th th e d a t a . A tnorlol t h a t  l n t o ar n t ll li  � o · r r '1 11 n d  
s i gna l l ing b e h av ior woul d a l gn i f i c a nt ly �xtend nndo r s t a u : l �R o f  tbe 
r e 1 a tivc rol e t h a t  these ph enomena p l ay i n  111' l.rranty m11d. � t. < .  u w d l  
a s  i n  o th e r  m a rke t s  i n  wh i ch inf orm n. t i on about produ c t  c pl�  '. i ty h 
c o s t ly to ob t a i n ,  
B ,  Norm n t ivo Impl i.o n t ions 
A  d o c i s i oum nker conce rne d w i th imporf c c t  l nf orm r ;t J , ,  i 5hr·d 1J 
want to know (a) wh ether i n s uf f ic i ent consumor s e a rch h�i;  � a u s e d  a 
given m nrlo t to behav e  noncom p e t i t i v eiy;, ( b )  t h o  form th > t  
noncomp e t i tive behnvior i s  l ikely t o  to. lo -- wh e ther J. t l �  o :t c C' s s iv c . 
pr i c e s, tho o f f ering of l e s s  p r e f er r e d  cont r a c t  t erm s , · or �.o th ;  and 
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(c } how nonoomp o t i t i v o  behav ior is b o s t  r om c d i e d .  Th e � e  <[ " (• s t i ons E• 1' � 
•.e l dom a s l:od r i gor ous l y ,  l n rgoly because r i gorona t o ol ·. <l i th .,,.h l ch t o
a nswer thorn nrc l ac ki ng , Th o modol s o t  f o r th h e r e  r o p r (l � " " t  � a n
a t t empt t o  f i l l  th i s  g a p ,  As a n  cxalllpl o o f  i t �  po 1 s lbl ¢ ut ! l i ty i n
evalua t i ng m nrke t out com e s ,  anppo so that r epr o n o nt a t lv e  dn t.� for th o 
compa r a t i v e  a dv nnt a g e 8  t o  f i rm s  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  marke t C>f � o i l ing w i th
and w i th out w a rrant i e s  c a n  be obtained. A rough o s t i ro J t �  of how much
shopp ing i s  no c o s s n ry to y i e l d  a comp c t i tiv11 outcome 1" � h '. t.  mnrkc:t. 
111ay bo deriv e d ,  M e a suri n g  a c t ua l  &hopping boh nv i or shou l d  t h e n
i l l um i na te th o que s t i on whether t h e  m arke t h pi>rform it1 g  H 1 l t or
badly , Simil a rly, if such d a t a  ah.ow ed, whon co11&nm e r g  :r '· � :- orrod 
warrant i e s ,  th a t  f i rm s  had a compa rative adv a nt a ge a t  m � Jd i1 R them ,  
thon e v e n  s o o m i n g l y  " th i n" w11 rr11 nty , cov era ge . m ny ftct n a 1  l.y bo t h o
p r o du c t  o f  o o n s u m o r  p r ef or onco s; f o r  w h e n  thn comp11 ra t J v ·  n dv n n l • g � 
27 
run & th i s  way, f i rm s  e xpl o i t  m a rke t pow er duo to i ns uf f i c i ent ae arch 
on1y by ch arging noncompe t i t i v e  p r i o e a .  If consum e r s  engage  i n  
r e l a tively l i ttl e s e a rch, how ev er, th e s e  pri c e s  p r obably a r e  b e i ng 
charg e d .  
Respe c t i ng r em edi e s  t o  c a s e  i nform a t i on probl em s ,  because  
d e s i rabl e equil ibr i a  are i n  s i gn i f i c a nt part a fun c t i o n  of th o amount 
of compa ri son shopping i n  which\ consumers  enga g e ,  tho model a l so 
impl i e s  that  r e gul a t i on, when c a l l ed f or, shoul d a t t empt t o  r educ e tho 
co s t s  t o  consum e r s  o f  di rect ly comp a ring warranty cov erage a c r o s s  
f i rm s ,  S t atut e s  t h a t  encourage f i rm s  t o  s o t  f or th tho term s  o f  
cov erage  in  "pl a i n" langua g e  thus. s e em inferior t o  l o gi s l n t i o n  
r equi ring a l l  firm s  t o  s t a nda rdi z e  t h e  l angua ge i n  whi ch w a rrant i e s  
arc q uo t e d ,  Al so,  our model  s ug g e s t s  that  i n  m a ny  marke t s  f i rm s a r o
mor e l ikely to e xp l o i t  insuf f i c i ent s o n rch b y  ch argi ng noncompe t i t iv e  
pr i c e s than by o f f e r i ng unde s i rabl e  wa rranty cov e r a g e ,  Thu s ,  th o 
l aw ' s s t r ong e f for t s  to e xp a nd w arranty cov er a g e  s e em m i sconc e i v e d ,  
Pe rhap s the  sta t e  s houl d i n s t e a d  e ncourage g r e a t e r  s e a rch i n  warranty 
marke t s  a nd a c cept tho  out com e s  that  s e a rch produ c e s ,  
C .  Lim i t a t i o n s  
Th e s e  pol i cy impl ica tions shoul d be r e garded m o r e  a s  
t ent a t iv e ly s o t  f o r th than a s  f i rmly sugg e st e d .  Th i s  i s  i n i t i a l ly 
becaus e i t  w i l l  be v ery d i f f icnl t--pe rhap s impo s s i b l e--to obt a i n  tho 
data our model r eq u i re s  t o  evaluate market out com e s  r i gorous ly ( s e c  
a l s o  S c hw a r tz a n d  W i l de ,  1 97 9 ) , nonce, i t s  u s e  wil  1 at  bc H t  s u g g e s t
r a th e r  t h an demon s t r a t e  how p a rt i cul ar marke t s  a r e  perform i n g .  
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Sug g e s t i v e  r e s ul t s  ba s e d  on tho ory, though, s e em an  a dv a n o o  o v n r  whnt
now pa s s e s  for j ud gm ent s o f  ma rke t perfot'lll anc o .  The m o d e l ' �  n � c  for 
pol icy purpo se s,  how ever, h a l so  l im i t e d  by th o strong �. ; ,; nrapti ont on
which i � r o s t s ; Wha t  is  tho p o u ibl e '  impa ct o f  r.o l ax i nc F rn e.- of .th e s e
a s sumpt i on s ?  
We ru nko t h o  strong a s sumpt i on t h a t  c o n s \une r s  Jrn< .� ;'.' n .ll nr·o 
1 1  probab i l i ti e s ,  Supp o s e  w e  sub s t i tu t e  th e weake r  u s uropt i '"' th. 11. t
perceiv ed fai l ur e  p robabi l i t i e s  a r e . a  fun c t i o n  of a c t u n l one & b u t  th n l
m i st a ke s  a r e  po s s ibl e ,  Throe po s s ibl e out com e s  coul d ob t � i n :  { n )  
Perceived  f a i l ur e  probab i l iti e s  c l us t er .i n an ·  unb i a s e d  -.rny About 
a ctua l  one s ,  Tll en  if  e a ch f i nn '  s demand c urv e is  r cp r o s o u t n t i v o  of 
th e consum e r  popul ati on, firms p robably will be indu c e d to p r oY i dc the
cor r e c t  cov er a g e ;  th ey wil l re spond as if each consumer kn r Y  tho
1 2  f a i l ur e  probabi l i ty . (b ) Poreeived  f a i l ur e  probabi l i t i e s  c l u s t e r
around po i nt s  h i gh e r  than t h e  a c t u a l  one s ;  consumers  a rc 
" p e s s im i s t i c , " in that th ey bel i ev e  product perform anc e to be wor se
than it  is  i n  f a ct n�d cons eque n t ly dem and oxe o s s ivo  w n rrnnty
cov er ag e .  If s u f f i c i ent consum e r  a � arch o c cur s,  th e out com e s  i n  th i s
s e_cond e 11 s o  nev'o r thcl c s s  shoul d bo aa ti sfyl.ng nonn a tiv e ly , To s e e
why ,  anppo s c  th a t  consum e r s_ a r e  p e s s imi s t i c  a n d  f i nn s  respo o ,f by 
offering broa d wa rra nty cov�r n g o  a t . pr i c e s that  woul d b e  J u s t i f ie d
only if 'cons \Ull er p e r c e p t i ons  w e r e  corr e c t �  A f i rm coul d  <0 o � t. 1 e � � ly 
reduce tho p r i ce for th h oovo r n g e  be Q a n s e  i t s  'JIArranty J' r "c,1 l s o no (! d 
not be r e d e em e d ;  th o product a c t u a l ly works w el l .  If ev � �  �"mo  
consum e r s  shopped,  a f irm tl1nt  so r oduo o d_ p r i c e s  woul d i nc " " " fi � i t • 
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dem and, and t h e r eby e arn po s i ti v e  prof i t s .  Rene e ,  a m arke t out come i n  
w h i ch a l l  f i rm s  ov ercharged consumer& for w 11 r
.
ra nty cov e r a ge woul d not 
b e  an e q u i l ibr ium ;  firms would h av e  a n  i nc o nt i v o  t o  reduce tho pri ce 
f o r  th e exc e s s iv e cov erage that c o n s um e r s  demand . No f irm woul d 
r oduo o i t a p r i c e  f o r  a warranty b e l ow the l evel a t  which i t  coul d 
r e cover i t s  c o s t ;  when pri c e  e q ua l s  co s t  i t  w i l l  refl ect n ct u a l  
f a i l ur e probabil i t i e s ,  Th i s � ·  the compe t i t iv e  pri c e ,  a n d  i f  enough 
consum e r s  shop i t  w i l l  a l s o  be the m arke t pri ce . Th u s ,  consum er s  w i l l 
pay th o correct pr i ce for w arranty cov e r a g e  d e s p i t e  th e i r  
m i s p o r c o p t i on. I f  i n s uf f i c i ent ac a rch oc cur s ,  pr i c e s  w i l l  be too 
h i gh ,  but th i s  is  only to say that th e probl em i s  i n s u f f i c i ent s e arch, 
not th o m i sp o r c o p t i o n  of f a i l ur e  probabi l i t i e s ,  .if consum e r s  gonern l ly 
a r o  po s s i m i st i c ,  ( c )  Con s um e r s  a r c  opt i m i s t i c ;  th oy demnnd l o s s
wa rranty cov erage th an they shoul d want b e c a u s e  t h ey bel i ov o  f a i l ur e  
probab i l i t i e s  to bo l ower t h a n  they a c t u a l ly a r c .
Thi s  th ird c a s e  i s  t roubl e some b e c a u s e  f irm s  h av e  n o  incentive 
t o  oxp n nd warranty c�v crago w i th out incr e a s i n g  p r i ce s,  s i n c o  th i s  s o r t  
of w a rranty prom i s e  w i l l  h av e  t o  b e  r e d e em e d .  Th o  m n rkc t w i l l . not
corr e c t  for opt i m i sm .  Therefore,  th e que s t i on i s  whether consum e r s  in 
g o no r a l  a r o  opt i m i s t i c .  Th e v ery a pa rso e v i d e n c e  t h a t  oxi s t s  s ug g e s t s  
1 3  . n o t ,  and consum e r s  commonly are a s sum e d  t o  be r isk aver s e ,  wh i ch i s  
i ncon s i s t ent w i th oxc o s sivc opt i m ism, I n  a ny ovont, th i s  pl a i nly i s  a 
quo s t i on on wh i ch f a c t s a ro m o r e  de s i rabl e t h a n  spo cul n t i on , ·  To tho 
ext e nt that opt i m i nm is common a nd prov id i n g  d o t n  a bout correct · 
f a i l ur e  probl\ bi l i t i o s v ery expe n s i v e ,  it m 11y be w h o  to e xpn n<l 
warranty covcr�gc through r e gu l a ti on .  
We al so a s sume that consum e r s  c a nno t n f foct f 1 d l n i. o  
probabi l i t i e s .  Suppo s e  t h oy c a n, i f  only by us ing th e pi:o;l li c t  more or 
l o s s  i nt en s i v ely . In one s e n s e ,  t h h  a b U :lty. h i iro l ov 11 H  to our 
analy s i s .  Th a t  cons um er s  c a n  a f f e c t  h i l ur o  probnbi l i Li o t. ;d. ll  
infl nonce t h o i r dom nnd f or wa rranty coverage,  but w e  t a ko U d  s dom u.d 
as g iv en, u ki n g  o nly whe th e r  m arb t s  w i l l  r11 11pon<l 11 d e CJ. ttll ' .-; J y  t o  i t ,  
For cxnmpl o ,  suppo s e  th a t  consum e r s .  a re l e s s  c a ref ul wh e n  t h r,y hnv e 
w arranty p r o t e c t i on, Shoul d c o n s um e r s  be ri sk neutral , a n  a r guahly
r e a s ona b l e approxi m a t i on h er o ,  auch incr e a s e d  c 11 r c l c u �o u  v. 011l d c a u s o  
sW t o  f a l l ,  f o r  , SW = s ( l - 11) , Al so,  a w  woul d f a l l b o c a u g o  w a rrant i e s
woul d b e come m o r e  impo r t a nt t o  consum o r s ,  and f i rm s  h av·o '• comp11 r a t i v <>  
a dv antn .ge r el a ti v e  t o  consumer s a t  l!l D k i n g  t h em (hw ri n r, �  f �. G I  or · th l\ n
cw> · I f  i t  do st s r e l a t iv e ly · l i t tl e t o  m a ko a w a rranty,  aw woul d f al l 
fa s t er than aw; The o r em 1 then imp l i c a  that • compc t i t i v o  ,.q ul l ibr i 11n 
i s  m o r e  l ikely t o  o b t a i n .  I n  a d d i t ! on, f irm s w i l l  be l o s a  l i ke ly t o
d e t e r i o r a t e  w a rranty cov e r a g e  when m o r a l  haz a rd .  e x i s t s ,  Th i �  i s
b e c a u s e  m or a l  haz n rd c a us e s  «w to f a l l  but l e �v o s  � aua f fo c t ed;  s l n-00 
«w n e c o n a ri ly f a l l s  rel a tive t o  aW f i rm s  a rc more l ikely ta h :iv e  a 
1 4  comp a ra t i v e  a dv a n t 11 g o  a t  s e l l i ng w i th w a rrant i e s .  llo nc t ,  ·)u;. 
a naly s i s  a o om i ng l y  a ccomm.o d a t c s  r e l au t i on of · th e  a uwnpt i · · ;; t.;1 ,.. t 
comsum o r s  c o nnot a f f e ct 11 .  Th i s  r e spo n s e  i 1  t oo s i mpl e ,  l; e>u ev o r ,. 
b e c a u s e  when conirnm o r c  c a n  i n f l u e n c e  f a i l ure pr. o b l\ b l l l t i !'J • . · �1 07 ln"Y
d e s i re d i f f o r ont w arranty covor a 11o s .  A consum e r  w i th t o n  di.l l dr e n
coul d w o nt 11 s t r o n g e .r w11rr11 nty on a · w ci sh ing mac1dno th n n  a c 0 .1 • 1itn <' t  
with no chil dr en, Vic i nstead a uume that  constl!llers  are  bomogeno ous ;
in our mode l ,  al l wnnt warrant i e s  or none do , 
Suppose th at some conslll!ler s  in a given marke t prefer 
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warrant i e s  but others  do  not  (or  some prefer stronger warranti e s  than 
other s ) , We h av e  shown i n  an  e arl i er  paper ( Schwartz and Wi lde ,  1 98 2 )  
th a t  when consumer preference s a rc h e terogene ous a nd f irms can offer 
di ffer ent product s , th e marke t l  f or tho product s wil l often s egment ; 
flrms s e l l ing particul ar  product s w i l l  s e l l  only to consumers who 
pr efer thoso  produc t s .  Apply ing that  analysi s horo ,  unl e s s  consumers 
who prefer warrant i e s  wil l buy without warrant i e s  i f  the ir  ao nrch 
reveal s only de n l era  who refuse t o  warrant, and unl e s s  consumers who 
do not pr ofor w arrant i e s  wil l buy w i th w arrant i e s  if the i r  se arch 
reveal s only de al e r s  who warrant , the two m arke t s  wil l s egment : a l l  
consum er s  who pref er warrant i e s  w i l l  b e  i n  one marke t, and a l l  
consum er s  who do not w i l l  b e  in the other, In effect,  these  wil l be 
marke t s  f or homogeneous goods,  a c a s e  wo h ave previously analyzed ( s e c  
Schwartz and W il de ,  1 97 9 ) , Warranty and nonwarranty marke t s  wil l a l so 
s egment unl e s s  tho marginal co st t o  f irms  of offering warrnnt i e s  
Oitcooda  t h e  margiru d  wil l ingne s s  t o  pay for them o f  consnmors who do 
not pr efer  warrant i e s but i s  l es s  than the  marginal wil l ingn� s s  to pay 
for th em of con1nmors who do profer warrant i e s ,  Tho rati onal e of thi s  
se cond condi t i on for nonaegmenta tion l a  that i f  tho marginal  co s t  of
�aking wa rrant i e s  i s  l e a s  t h a n  tho m arginal w i l l i n g n e s s  to pay for 
them o f bo th s o t s  of oon&um ers ,  a l l  conaumors woul d bo in th e Tarrnnty
marke t;  a i m i l n r l y ,  if the marginal oo'at of m 11 H n g  wa rrn nt i e a oxcoeds
the �il l ingno u t o  p11y for  th  om  of both 11eti o f  c o n s nm <1 u ,  r. 1 1  
consumers  would be  i n  tho nonwnrrnnty marke t .  When tho t c r.ond 
c·ond i t i on for nonso gmenta t ion doe s not hold,  th o analy t i c  m � do in th'i �
p a p e r  woul d npply, for thou a l l  consumers in  a parti cul.o i:  1111\ r.ke t woul d 
prefer waru.nti'e s or none woul d ,  S ince t h o  two condi t i on� ' or 
nonse gmenta t i on j ust  described are  nontriv i a l ,  when consum e r  
prefer ence s for warrant i e s  a r e  h e t erogene ous , our exi s t i nR K h 1 l� s e 1  
o f t en  w i l l suffice .
We 11 1  so h av e  sh01l'n that  when . m arke t s  f or h o t o r o g c n c o u �  g0ods
i nt eract,  n compe t i t iv e  equil ibrium wi l l  occur in  both i f  · n  qnfficl ent
number of cons nm or s  oompnri son shop . Hence ,  our rocommend11 tJ. on h!'TO
that tho performance of badly behaved warranty marke t s  w i l l be 
improved by reducing tho cost s  t o  consumers of  compnri son sh upping
ho� ds  even whon consumer· prefer enc e s  for w arrllnt i os aro  A ' & u.n o d  t o  be
he terogeneous , Ilowover, no one ha s  yet  de scribed tho ld 1i rl.� o f  
noncompeti tive equll ibrill  that  wil l exi st  i n  l'lllrl.o t a  in  ;r h l. c l 1  .{lrodn�t s
and consumers are  h e t erogene ous a 11d insuff i c i ent compa rhon " ·c1 opping 
occur s ,  Th o  pra cti cal  importance of th i s  fail ing h th � t  1�1 i th c r  tho
r esponse of f irm.s to imperfoct �nform11. tion nor the fea tn.· .. � t h 11. t
charact erize  bad  oquil ibri a  i n  these  c a se s a re 11ow known. 11i erofOJ:o,  
if  consumer prcforonc o s  for warranty coverage Aro h e t er.o g � ll � ous ahd 
the r e s u l t a nt warranty mnrke t a  do int oracf, we c�nnot no� t o l l  
deoi s ionmnker n  bow to rocogniz o  poorly porform i11g w11 rr11nty ;�uk� t a .  
Nor can w e  prov ide pol icy sng g o ati ons, apart  from the r r> c or. nll1nd 11 t i cm 
that i ncroas ing comparison shopping i s  l iloly to improv e poor 
pe rf  orm anco , Ilow s i gn i f icant a 1 imi t a t i on on our ·ana1y s i s  co nsumer
hetero g e n e i ty creates  is  a h  omp i r i c a l  que s t i on,
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1 .  Murray v ,  Hol l iday Rnmbl er, Inc . ,  8 3  Wi s ,  .2d  406 , 265  N .  \V ,  Z d  513 
( 1978 ) • 
2 ,  ' Ma gnuson-Mo s s  Act ae·c t i on 102 ( 11 ) , 
3 ,  Maguuson-·Mo s s Act sect i on 108 ( a ) . 
4 .  Ma gnuson-Mo s s  Act a o c t i o n  102 ( a ) , 
S ,  ' ir 11 consum e r  buy a tho good w i thout a w a rr11nty and i t  ( ,, !. l s, vo 
li a s nm o  for oonv oni ence that th o oonawncr oxi t a ·  th o mr1 }, o  l rath e r  
t h a n  r epurch a s e s .  
_ ne ce s s a ry to t h o  po si tive  upo ct of  our r e sul t s ,  i n  th 5 t  t11 0  
, cquil ibr i a  w e  charact eri z e  d o  not depend o n  consum e r �  l1Vi" ing 11; 
ra th or, wo 11 a k o nly how consrunor p r o f oronco s f or w n r r n n > y  
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oov crago , whoth or "mistaken" o r  "correct, "  aro rofloct cd i n  
marke t porf orm �nco,  Th e  assumpt i on that consum ers k:now n i s  
r ol ovant t o  a normativ e  evaluation of  our rosnlta, in tha t  i f  tho 
mnrkot accurately refl ects m i staken preference s,  th o ros ultant 
equ ilibrimn ca nnot be parcto optimal . Part 4 l a t or di scusses tho 
normative implications of rel axi ng th o assumption t h a t  n i s
known. 
7 .  Th is a o nrch strategy is oonsiatont with Stigler' s original work 
on th e oconom ica of info1'11! 11ti on but aomewhnt at odds with m·oro 
r o co nt so arch-th ooretio model s  of consumer behavior in market s  
for hotorogcno oua goods (�·A• W i l de ) , For a j ustification of
th h str11togy in th o pres e nt context, soc W ilde and Sch•artz; 
Schw a rtz a nd l ildo ( 19 7 9 ) . 
8 .  See Magnuson-Mo u Act so  ct ion 103 . 
9 ,  By " willingne ss to pay" we r e f er to th o .hl.81!.m price that a 
cons11111 er would be will ing t o  pay for th e good with a warranty, 
and the high e s t  price that would be pai d  for tho good with o ut 
one . We a s s um e  hw > hN because i t  would be i rrational even of 
conswners who do not prefer warranti es t o  be wil l ing t o  pay more 
for th e good w i t hout a warranty than with ono, a warranty b e i ng 11 
d e s i rable product f ea tur e .  In our mode l ,  a consumer does not 
pr of er a w a r r a nty only if, when offered tho opportun ity to buy 
tho produc t w i th and without a warranty a t  o n ch i t em ' s  
compe t i tiv e pr i ce , tho consum er i s  unwilling t o  pny tho prem i um 
for 'ff nrranty cov er n go that f i rms mnat chargo to r o c o ·; o r:. t.h e i r  
co sts, For. conv eni ence , 'll O u s11111 c that the w illingno t , ,, '· to po.; 
-hw nnd hN--are i d e ntical for: d l  oo ns11111 ers; th e m o ri .� ;. ' ' r e � n l  ts 
are qualitati vely unchanged i f  th is assumption is red  i n d ,  s ,, e  
W i l do and Schwarti:, 1 97 9 , Tho abs o l ute lllagn i tude _ o f  i1 :i• e. ncl hN 
aro i n  part a function of consumor preference s ;  for \•JLc;plo, Ji.,; 
is 1 ikoly to bo h igh er, othor things equal, fr oo n s nm n a  prof o r
•orranti es,
10 , This re sult is of norm a ti ve i nt er est if, as dech i olll!H, ; . .  ·. r s
commonly as sum e, warranti es 11 r o  "good things" for co n � ,- 11 � r �  to 
h av e ,  Warranti es coul d bo good things bocnu s o  it mat H om 
prudent of consum ers t o  i nsur e agai nst significant h an, � , �uch a �
a maj or consumer durabl e b e i ng a l emon, and boca n n o , { ,-.  n rol atod 
vein, po sitive externali ti es to th e maki ng of warr�ut i o c  m ny bo 
thought to exist ,  A a  to th ose , a oonsumor' & fam ily 111 1\y al so 
bonofit from his or hor purchase of warr�nty protocti c n .  S e ct i on 
2-3 18 A of th e Uniform Commerc i al Code,  i n  pursua nco  <•!' t h o  
boliof that ext ernaliti es of t�ls  sort exi £t, prov i do · that " a
sol lor' s warranty , , , extonda to any natural po r � o n  . ,ho i �  in  
th o f lllll ily or household of his  buyer or i i  a guo a t  �. n h J. •1 homo if  
it is  reasonable to o xpcct that a uoh pori o n  ID llY uso,  cn •1 >- , ·Jll o or: 
be affoctod by tho goods 11 nd who h i nj ured i n  p e r son · · ·  b i- � s. r. h  
o f  tho wa rrnnty, n  
11 , An a ddi t i ona l a a attmpt ion made abov o,  th at i s  s t a nda rd i n  t h e
oc onomic l i t crA turo, i •  t h a t  o a ch f irm se l l s  a s i ngl o product ;
hero,  e a ch f i rm aol l s  w i th w a rrant i e s  o r  w i thout them ,  but c a nnot . 
offer  dif for ont covorago a .  In actual  ma rke t s ,  f i rm s  som e t i m e s  
so l l  w i th a s t a ndard warranty b u t  offer cons um e r s  a n  opti ona l 
wa rranty at extra co st that  i s  e i th er more ext ensive  or of longer
dur a t i on th an tho  r e gul a� w a rranty . Our a na ly s i s  doe s no t perm i t . 
a f orm a l  ev a l ua t i on of th i s  p r a ct i c e ,  but we sus p e c t  that  i t s
wel fare e f f e c t s a r c  amb i guous , Th o  g a i n  t o  consum e r s  i s  a n
incr e a s e d  l ikel ihood o f  ge t t i n g  warrant i e s they want a t  r e du c e d  
s e arch co s t a ,  I f  conanmora s e a rch f or. d e s i red warranty cov erage  
as  well  as  for l ow pri c e s, how ever, tho prosenco of 
"mul ti covor a g o  f irm s" may i n  f act r e duce s e a rch, which coul d 
cause pr i c e s t o  r i se .  A simil ar  ambi guous wel fare e f fect coul d 
a t t e nd r e gul a t i o n  that  r equ i r e s  f i rm s  t o  e xp a nd warranty 
cov er a g e . If consum e r s  woul d s e arch l o s s  be cause they knew th at  
ev e ry f i rm o f f er s  a good warranty, p r i ce s cou l d  r i s e .  On the 
oth e r  hand, H r egul a ti o n  i s  l im i t e d  to th o c a s o  that Theorem 3 
d e s c ribo s ,  where f i rm s  h av o  a comparative advant a g e  a t  se l l ing 
w i th out w a rranti e s  a nd p r o s o nt se arch h i n suf f i c i ent t o  g c no r n t e ' 
comp e t i t i v e  oqui l ibri a, r e gu l a t i o n  m ay produce no t wel fare g a i ns,  
adm ini s t r a tiv e  o o s t a  a si d e .  
1 2 .  Th i s  i s  l ikely to be  t h o  ca se i f  th o s t a ndard dev ia t i on o f
oon snm o r  e s t i m a t e s  i s  r o l a t ivoly sm al l .
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13 . Corv il l o  and H ausman r opor t 11 1975 anrt cy oondnot o d  l':Y i: ;l t, 
Univ er s i ty of Mi ch i gan Surv ey Rese arch Center,  in wh i .:h c:onnMors
perceived 11 no o d  for r epa i rs in h om e  appl'h'nc o s  that  'u . .  1
cons i derably g r e a t e r  than tho f a i l ur o a  they had a c t u a J. .ly 
oxp o r i oncod in  p a s t  p e r i od s ,  S t r i ct ly apoaking, th i s  � ·uvor only
supports  t h e  hypo th e s i s  that consum e r s  th,ink t,hing � P. rr. i e t: t i ng 
worse,  not t h n t  they a ro pe s s i m i st i c  r o l n t iv o  to· 11 ct- n n l fail ure 
probabi l i t i e s ,  The survey n.evorth o l e a s  seems mor e c o n & l's t.,iut w i t h  
a pe s s imi s t i c  than w i th a n  opt im i s t i c  a tt i tude , 
14 . Al so, suppo s e  we r o l ax t h o  a s sumpt i o n  t h a t  n i s  o xo s e � � o us t o
p rov ide t h a t  ( 0.  firm s  r educ e  n:--md:e produc t s  more r e l  if,bl c­
whon they mnke w a rrant i e s  a nd ( i i )  consnm9r·s are  ri �.\: nont r a l , 
The n i f  tho wil l i ngne s s  to pay ( hw) r i so.a mor e rap l d l y  Uin11 i i r-i« 
cost s C c1 J ,  nw f al l s  .and w a rrnnty coverage  i 5 · l e s a  l l � � l y  to b� a 
probl em , Oth erw i s e ,  cov erage  i s  more l ikely to be , nn i s rne . · If 
consumer s a r e  r i sk ave r s e ,  a r oduc t i on i n  f 11 i l ure prot;,, b i l it i o s  
by f i rm s  i s  mor o l ikely t o  m ake cov etago B probl em ,  bn t t h o  
wel fare impl i c a t i ons o f  th i s  concl us i on a r c  ambi guo us , 
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APPENDIX I 
Proo f of Th eorem 3 :
Tho proof of th i s  r e sul t i s  t edi ous a nd . b e g � ns w i th n R c r i o a
o f  Lemm a s ,
• 
Proo f o f  Lemma : S uppo s e  GN ( pN ) > 0 ,
r�' 
Then o xp c c t c d  domand � t pl! i s  s 
(by z oro prof i t s ) , 
a tt r a c t  s consum er s ,  
- . 
A f i rm charging Pw � hw - � + pN w i l l �l no
But i t ' s  pro f it s . a r e • th e n  
Q, E. n .  
Lemm!\ 2 :  I f · � > 0 and nw > 0 the s uppor t s  of th.e di s t r i bu t i ons GN( • ) 
a nd GW( ' ) c a nnot h a v e  m o r e  than a s i ng l e po i nt i n  corrimon i n  t h o  s e nse
Pro o f  o f  Lemma : Suppo se two inch p r i c e s  exi s t 1 ,  PN and qN " �'ow 
exp e c t ed dem and a t  PN equa l s  e xp e c t  c d  demand a t  hw - � + PN ';Id 
exp e c t ed dem and a t  qN eq ual s exp e c t e d  demand at hw - ·  hN + qw · Jnun ,
us i ng obvious not a t i on, wo have 




DN ( qN) ( qN - o ) - F ft 0.,..< 11¥  - � + qN) (hw - � + qN - cW) - (F .
+ F' ) ,
(A2)  
• ,  
where kw ., ( hw  - cw) - (�  - o ) , Thus expe cted  demnnd i s  .equnl at  pN� 
and qN which v iol a t e s  z�ro prof its ,  Q, E, D, 
Wo are now ready to cons i der  the po ssibl e equil ibrium 
. conf igur ati ons i n  more detai l ,  Three po s s ibi l it i e s  exi st ,  In c n ch 
°N ) 0 and tho di s t r ibut ion i n  tho nonwnrrant i e s marke t covers 
noncompet i tive pri c e s  only. However, th o warrant i e s  marke t can bo 
nonexi s t ent, compe ti tive or noncompe titive ,  We consider  tho 
po s s ibi l it i e s  in that orde r .  
Lemma 3 :  Nece s s ary and suffici ent conditi ons for � .c 0 arc :
C i )  a1 � l °N ( a1 + 2 a2 )
( i i)  a1F1 /iw l °NCa1 + 2 112 )
J>roof o f  Lemm� : If � ., O th en the  maximum price  i n  tl10 nonwarrant i c s  
marke t i s  �· Zoro prof its  then impl i e s  o = "'N/a1 • Let qN  b e  the
minimum price i n  th e nonwarrant i e s  marke t ,  Zero prof it s  impl i e s  
Now i t  must  b e  tho c a  s o  th at qN 2 o + (F/aw) or f irms  coul d entex the
wnrrant i c s  marke t n t  hw - � + qN and e arn po si tive prof i t s .  Thi s
r·eduoo ft  to  conrl i  t i  o n  ( i ) . 
Considor a f inn ent ering tho w�rrant i e s  �nrlo t .  �� no c d  t o  
know th o f orm o f  nw< q )  for q a [qW' 11¥1 where qw ,. hw - � �- '1 w  In
general 
But z ero  Prof i ts impl i e s  
(A4 )  
Subst i tut ing (A4 )  into (A3 ) gives  
� ( q) "' [F ( q  - cw> / <� - hw + q - c ) ]  - (F + F' ) 
whi ch i s  deor e a
.
s ing  i n  q when kw "' <llw - cw> - ( � - o )  > 0 ( lfld . ch i t
i s  whon F� .>- 0 ) . Thus w e  nee d  only 'ensure nw( qW) � O - n o u · � .i. t 1 c1n 
( i i ) . Q, E, D. 
• 
Lemma 1 :  Nece ssary and a nffici ent conditions f or � > 0 & nd G iq (plf) "" 1
ar e :  
( i) . Ca1 + 2 a2 > "'N > a1 sw
:( i i )  a1 SW ) °l{ 
( i i i) a1F ' /iw 2 2a1 sw - ( a1 + 2 12 ) °1{  
Proof o f  Lomm n : Aga in, th e maximum price i n  th e nonwarrl! •' :  .' ·' "- m1 rk<J t 
h hN and hence o c o.N/al .
In th i s  cn s o  qN i s  given by 0 ( 111 + 
Zero prof i t s  n t  • Pw impl i e s  o { n1 + 2 n2 [nN + 
2 112 nN) ( qN - c )  
c�/2 i 1 1  ,., 6Vl .. 
- IT "' 0 ,
';,, l v :l t< g  r o r  
43 
�· nw and qN gives  
qN = c + { a1F/[ 2a1 • w  - C a1 + 2 a2 ) °N] ) ,
°N = ( a1 8w - °N ) /a2°N '
nw .. [ ( al + 2 82 ) °N - al 8w1 /a2°N ·
Condi t i on ( i )  i s  g iven by nw > 0 and condit ion ( ii )  by °N > 0 ,  Theso
condi t i ons al so gua rant e e  c + C F/sN) ( qN ( hN ( s e e  the proof of  Lomma
3 ) • 
Condi t iou  ( i i i )  gua rant e e s  nN( qw) i o whero qw = 
Thi s  suf f ices  t o  rul e out entry in  tho  warrant i es marke t 
a i nco nw <P >  i s  decroas ing as i n  the proof of Lemma 3 , 
hw - � +
• 
abov o Pw 
Q, E, D, 
Lemm� 5 :  N c o o s s a ry and suffici ent conditions for °N > 0 and ttw > 0 
lflth bo th marke t s  noncompetitive  are :  
( i) •w 2 F ' /kvJ 
( i i )  F ' /iw .l °N
( i i i) C l + a2 > iw°N 2 a1F '
( iv) a1F' /1w i 2a1 sW � ( 1 + a2 ) °N
Proof o f  Lemma : 
qN, 
max max It  is impo 1 1 ibl e for both pN a � and Pw = hw s inco z ero
max m ax < h . .  prof it s  for both woul d be v iol a t ed.  Suppo se Pw = hw and Pn -'N • 
Zero profits a t  hw imp l i e s  o n  aW/a1 , Nonentry at hN then impl i e s
� 2 °N •  S ince p�ax ( �· there  must bo f irm s l ocated cont i nuously on
hw - � + �nx in the warrant i e s  m arko t , As in  the proof o f  Lemma 2 ,
max maxexpe c t ed  dem and wil l be equal at PN a nd hw - � + PN 
Fur thormor o ,  � oro pro f i t s  impl i e s
• ': '  
(!I +  !I' ) "' 0 
llonce p�ax = c + ( FF.w/F ' )  � a const ant, Lot qN 11 c + ( Flc .. (· ' )  rnd
qw = hw - � + qN' Next , no to  that Lemma 2 aho impl L '  
Gv/ hw - � + �nx) a GW( qw) = o ( o thonriao  th o support.£ d GN and Gw
would h avo two point s " i n  common" ) , Thus we h&ve  
o ( a1 + 2 a2nw) ( qN - c )  - F = 0 
11 ( 111 + 2 a2nw> < qw - cW) - (F + F' ) .. 0 ,  
which impl i e s  ttw = a1 ( F' - kw°N) /2az:t.w°N•  Thilt nw ) 0 tl u n  impl i e s
F'  - �°N > o ,  or  <iw < °N' lfhi ch contradi ct a CtW .l °N .  
Thus whon nw > 0 and 11omo warranti e a  U'O offorod .s 1. 
mnx maxnoncompe titive pr i c e s, Pw = qW and pN • � · Zoro · px:oi i t a at q N
and qW, ro spo ctiv cly, now imply 
o C a1 + 2 a2°N) ( qN - o )  - F = 0 ,
o ( a1 + 2 a2�) ( qW - cW) - ( F  + F' ) = O .
Fo l lowing tho above procodure, we now get  
� "' a1 (F ' - kw°N) ./2a2kw·°N'
� "' [ ( a1 + 2 a2 ) kw°N - a1F' 1 /2a2kw°N • 
qN "' c + ( Ftw/F ' )  • 
Condi t i on ( i) h given by qN > c + ( F /sw ) ,  condi tion ( i l)  ' y  '� > 0 
and cond i t i on ( i i i )  by nw > O .  Condition ( iv)  gua rant o <' �  • '  .. ( ' } h 
+ 
nondc gonornto ,  To deriv e  i t  we f irst cal cul a t e  GW(p1 J .  7 � r o  prof i t •  
! ! 
• 
at Pw impl ies 
. . 
Condition ( iv) is j ust OW ( pW) ( �1 . Q , E, D, 
Tho proof of the theorem fol l ows from tho se l emmas, Th a t  
4 5  
a1 sw > °N and °N < °"1 aro nece s sa ry fol l ows e a sily from noting the
l a t ter is equiv al ent to °N < F ' /kw , 
Suf ficiency is more troublesome, Lab e l  tho three type s of  
�quilibrium con s i dered in Lmnma s 4 ,  S ,  6 a s  type A ,  type B and type C, 
respectively, El imina ting tho conditions for e a ch which are qirectly 
implied by a1 sW > °N or °N < aw• we h av e ,  for each ca s e ,
A :  ( i) 
( ii) 
B :  ( i) 
( ii) 
( iii) 
C :  ( i) 
( ii) 
(al + 2 a2) °N > al 8w 
a1F' /iw � 2 a1 8w - ( al + 2 a2) °N 
BW ) F ' /kw 
( al + 2 az l Uyf  > a1F' /iw 
2 a1 sw - ( a1 + 2 a2) °N > a1F' /l:.W 
( 111 + 
( al 
+ 
2 12 ' °N < 11 'w
2 a2)°N < '1F' fkvt 




( d )  
( "1> )  
c -a) 
c - d >  
con s t r a i nt s  o r  th e i r  nega tion s ,  The s e  are l abe l ed a ,  b, c and d .  W e  
ne e d  to show that for any con s i stent combina tion of n, b, c ,  d o r  
the! r no g11 tion s ,  o n e  o f  tho oqd l ibd a hol d, Tan:\ o 1 8hm; � tlll\ t 0 11 ch 
cons i st ent combination yie l d s  a n  equil ibrium, and a l so iU 1:1 r .t r 11 h 1  the 
na ture of tho incon sist ency for tho other s ,  
Q, E, D, 
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APPENDIX II
Thi s  appendix considers  tho c a s e  i n  wh i ch oonaumor prefer no t 
to buy warrant i e s g i v e n  compe ti tive price s ,  Lim it  pr i ce s for the good 
w i th and without warrant i e s  a re lw and lN re spe c t ively. Thnt 
• • 
cons 11t1 o r s  pr e f er not to buy warranti e s m oans lw - lN < Pw - PN' 
Fur ther, we dof ino 
�N "' FI ( lN - c ) , 
�W c (F + F' ) /C lw - c1) ,
� c C lw - cw) - ( lN - c ) ,
Unl ike the  c a s e  i n  which consum er s  pref�r w nrrant i e s ,  � c a n  be  e i ther 
po si tive or ne ga tiv e .  Whil e � < 0 i s  t h e  "na tnrnl" a s sumpt i o n  given
• • 
1N - � ) lw - Pw• there i a  nothing t o  rul e .  out � ) o . Thi a  c a us e s
s om e  compl i c a t i on s i n  t h o  ne ce s sary and suffici ent condit ions f or th o 
various typ o s  of oqnil ibri 11 ,  but tho t e chnique s o f  proof are  s im il a r  
to tho s e  ns o d  i n  appendix I.  Additi ona l nota t i on w i l l  ei th e r  be  
def ined a s  needed  or  will  be  obv ious, In general GN( ' )  wil l refer t o  
t h o  dhtribnt i on of pri ce s i n  the  nonwarrant i e s  m arke t and GW( ' )  wil l 
refer to t h o  di s t r i bu t i on of pr i c e s i n  the warrant i e s  mnrke t .  
Theorem 1 :  Nece s 1 11 ry and s uf f i c i e nt c o nd i t i ons f or nonwnrrant i e s
c ompe t i t i v e  and warra n t i e s  nonex i s t ent a r e : 
( i ) a1 � fJN/s





Proof :  W i th 111 1 fi xtt s  charging pN i t  must b e  that \/N "' a,, o r  
41l 
11 "' �N/s , A firm d llv i a ti ng 
.
w i l l  ei ther ch arge 1N for non'rn t< ati e a  o r
lw for w a rr a nt i e s ,  In e i th er c n s c  i t  g e t s  only rionshoppo rt ,  bn t i n  
th•c wnrra nt i c t  m arke t onpa ci t y  equal s sf/ < a ,  Tbua w e  n o  o o
a1a( l N  - c )  � F 11nd S ( 1W - cf/ ) � F + F' , The110  y i e l d  ( i ) r ri d  ( i i )
r e s p e c t ively.  Q, E. D. 
Theorem 2 : Nece s sary and s u f f i c i ent cond i t i on s  for .!!!2.!lWnrr .>.ii � Ll'J!.  
none x f s t ont and wa rran t i e s  c ompe t i t iyo arc : 
( i) 111 � PN/ 5W 
C i i )  a1 i flwf sw
( ii i )  � 2. [ ( a1 + 2 a2 ) (F + F' ) - F J /sw C a1 + h2 ) .
Proo f :  Con�i t i on s  (l) a nd ( i i )  a r e  dorived i n  a fohion l\ M l o sons  t o  
Theor em 1 , Condi tion ( i i i )  guarant eo s  that  entoting t h o  llPll''<' , ;' a n t l e s
m arke t 11 t  pri ce s arbi trarily c l o se t o  pN - a i s  nnprof i ta1' 1 ,· ,  Iri 
th i s  c a s e  exp e c t e d  prof i t  i s  
• 
But 11 = �W/a1 and pN = lN - lw + Pw -= lN - lw + °w + (F + F ' ) /., "� '  
Requiring th a t  rrN (pN - s ) � 0 for a l l  a >  0 yields  ( i i i ) . 1 . r . .  D .  
The orem 3 :  Ne c e s sary 11nd s uf f i c i ent co;11di t i ons for both m n d. £.i s. 
c ompe t i t iyo arc : 
( i )  112 s ) s - S W  ) 112 5w 
( i i )  a 1  ( s - sw ) / 112 � m i n  fflw flwl  
49 . 
• • 
Proo f :  Z oro prof i t s  a t  pN a nd Pw r equires  exp e c t e d  dem and equal a a nd 
•w re spo o t ively . llonoo 
and 
Solving for a ,  °N and nw ( us ing nw + °N = 1 ) y i e l ds : 
a Q ( s - sw> /112 
°N = [ s  - ( a1 + 2 a2 ) &wl /a2 ( s  - iw> 
nw "' < 'w - a1 s > I  a2 < • - *w> • 
Condi t i o n  ( i ) com e s  from °N > 0 and nw ) O ,  Next consider devi ant
fi:rni L  Po u ibl o profit maxim iz ing pri co s a r e  pN - e ( for e ) 0 ) , l N' 
and lw , Nonpo s i tivo prof i t s  a t  tho l at t e r  two of tho se yields
condi tion ( i i )  and at tho f ormer y i elds  cond i t i on 
( iii) . Q, E, D, 
Th e o r em 4: N e c e s s a ry  and suf f i c i ent conditions for nonwarranti c s
nonex i s t ent and wa rrant ies  non competitive arc : 
( i ) flw a1 sw 
( i i) flw llN 
( iii) if ( 111 + 2 a2 ) flw > a1 sw th en 
[ kN 2. [ (F + F' ) /swl - [ a1F/flw < n1 + 2 n2 ) J . 
. 1 
Proo f :  . W11on th o w 11rrant i c a  m arko t i s  noncompe titiv e  and nN ,, O ,  :i<1ro 
prof i t � at 11 ( no c e s s n ri ly tho  highest price i n  the wnrran t ! e �  
marl:c t I )  impl i es a = �w/a1 , 
; '  i 
Fi r s t  we nood  t o  gua rant e e tha t  GN i s  nonde g c nci H. t ,, ,
• be th e ,  s i z e  of n ny po ·tential m a ss poi nt a t  Pw·· Zero profi . ' r, l rnp! i e a  
or, ' 
• 
Hence <1w < 1 i f f  a1 sw > flw· condi t i on ( i) . 
Next we c a l cul ate profit s for entry into tho no nw a n· r nt i e s  
, I 




5 0  
I 
since � · f irm ent ering tho nonw11rrantie s  marke t at q wil l J o s e  �hopp o r i  
I 
t o  tho �o Jirm s  o f f er i ng w a rrant i e s  a t  prlce a 1 0 1 1  than l '!'  ·- i,'l� + <i ·  
Sub.s t l �n t i ng t h o  d e f i ni ti on o f  Cl W  and simpli
fyin3 g i v o s
- . 
we a l so need to chock nN (pN - a ) for al l a > O ,  Dut Gw > 0 iff
(Ai + 2 a2>1lw and nN(pN - a) i O for all e > 0 i ff
Tho l at ter condi t ion impl ies � l 0 when
(F + F' ) /sw > a1F/llw < a1 + 2 n2> .
:l\ 
As l ong a s  F' I 0 and C a1 + 2 a2>1lw > al 'W' thi s  must a lways hold .
Moreover, llw � tiN i s  oquival ont to � l F ' /llN which al so i mpl i e s
� l 0 a s l ong a s  F' 1 0 ,  Thus conditi ons ( i i )  a nd ( i i i) suffice t o
charnct ori :t e  th i s  cuo i f  w e  c nn  show � < 0 ·  i s  impo s sibl e ,  But thi s 
i s  t r iv i al since rrN( lN) i 0 mus t a lways hold a nd thi s  impl i e s  � 1 0
a s  abov e ,  Q,E,D. 
The o r em S :  N e c e s s a ry and anffici ent condit ions for nonwnrrant i o s
nonc ornpe t i t iyo and wa rrantie s  nonex i s tent are : 
( i) PN < al �
( i i)  � < O ( whi ch impl i e s  � < llwl .
( i i i a )  If � > 0
(1 ) � l 
(a ) 
( ti ) 
(2 )  "N <
( a )  
( i i ib )  I f  � > 0 
( 1 ) � L.  
and a1 s � C a1 + 2 a2 ) 11N then
[ (F + F' ) /swl - { a1F/[2a2 s - C n1 + Z n2>pN ] }  impl i e s
a1 C 2 s - •w> < llNC a1 + 2 n2 l
1N � [ (F + F' ) /sw1 - C n1F/[2a1 s - C n1 + 2 n2 > 11N 1 l
[ (F + F' ) /swl - C a1F/[2a2 s - C n1 + 
2 a2>pN J J  impl i e s
"N i F ' /sw ·
and 111 a > C a1 + 2a2>11N th en 
{ (F + F' > /swl - [ a1F/C n1 + 2 n2 ) pN ] impl ie s
' I i 
I 
( 2 )  
(a ) 
< II >  
� <  
(a ) 
81 SW > llN ( 111 + 2 62 )
� l a1F 1 /<11N< a1 + 2 a2 ) 
[ (F + F' ) /sw ] - [a1F/< ai + 2112) tiN 1
� � F ' /sw· 
R!:.QQ! : Thi s  c n so i s  somewhat compl icn ted, Fi r s t ,  not e
in the 
point 
( i )  • 
usua l 
• 
a t  PN'
-f a shion, 
th e u s ua l 
Al so, if 
• 
GN is the s i:r. c  of  any 
... 
argument for GN < 1 yields a1 s 
. � 2 
impl l � �  
th � t a "' llN / a1 
po t 'l td. i I!:! mass 
> Pw oondl ti. on
Now cons i de r  entry into the warrant i e s  marke t .  U d  n g  




If � < O then nw > 0 ao i t  ma tt er s not whe ther GN h a s  e. l!l a s i;  po i nt ·n-t 
• 
pN' we nee d  only check llw ( lw) i 0 .  Expected demand !It L. h �1 cr ,  or
llw Dnt � < o impl i e s  � < f3w · Hence f3N < 131 < •w• nnd  H il()Od
llN( lw - cw> � F + P_F' , on tiN < Pw , which i s  already lm�J i o<l by 
�- < o .  
; Now, Sllppo sc � )  0 !10 th 11 t  nw( q) < o .  Fir a t , OC '1 · ! 1l o r  II l!l ! H �
$ 
po int n t  pN; L o . ,  a1 s � PN ( a1 + 2112 ) ,  Lo t rN he th o f :l r s t  1 > d c o  
• 
abov e  Pw a c t ua l ly offer ed , Then :i; cro profits  g i v e s
5 3  
If rN 2. pN' th o n  one ch o c h  to 1 0 0  whothor oxp o c t od d em a nd a t  rN i s
g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s  t h a n  s,, and th en chocks prof i t s  a t  rw • Iw - IN + rN. 
If rN < pN then one doc s t h e  s a m e  th i n g  f o r  pN s i n c e
• 
Pw • lw - IN + pN 
< Pw i n  th i s  c a se . 
Con s i de r  f i rst  rN 2. pN; i , o . , 
J. 
111 2. [ (F +· F' ) /swl - { [a1F/[2a2s - Ca1  + 2 a2 ) JlN] J . 
Exp e c t e d  dem and a t  rN i s
•he r o  rW = lw - IN + rN' Th i s  condi t i on i s  ne c e s s a ry s i nce
EOw < rw >  L 'w moans po si tiv e prof i t s  coul d be m a d e  at rw · If i t  hol d s ,
t h en w e  s t i l l ne ed nN ( rW) i 0 ,  or
• 
then Ye ne e d  � ( pW ) � O ,  or
Toie thor th e se argum en t s  g i v o  cond i t i on ( i i i ) , 
• 
Fi na l ly, suppo s e  th e r e  i 8  no m 11 s a  point A t  pN ; i .  '" , 
"' 
a1 s .> �N( a1 + 2 11:z ) , Let qN be th o f i r s t  pri ce above pN H t u d ly 
o f f er e d ,  Then zoro prof i t s  g i v e s  
Pro c e e d i n g  as  before, qN 2. pN i f f
Exp e ct e d  dcm.and n t  qN i s
Given th i s  oondi ti  on we need n ... ( o ,,,) i 0 ,  01· h II 
a s  befor e ,  1 1 ,  E. D .  
Theorem 6 :  N coouary 11nd auf.floi ent conditi ons for nonwnrrnnt i e s  
pompet i t iyo and warran t i e s  noncompetit ive are : 
( i) ( 111 + 2 112 > llw > al s > llw
( i i )  a2Jlw > a1 ( s - 'w)
( i i i ) � 2. [ (F + F' ) /swl - f a1F/[2a2 a  - C n1 + 2 n2 > JJw] }
( iv )  llw < JlN 
� 
Proof :  S ince the  w arrant i e s  marke t i s  noncompe t i t ive, a = llw/a1 ; Zoro 
• 
prof i t &  a t  pN impl i e s  
o r
� = [ ( a1 + 2 a2 ) a - J /a2a
nw = c �  - a) /112a ·
Cond i t i on  ( i )  i s  g i v e n  by � ) 0 and nw ) 0 ,
Zero prof i t s  a g a i n  impl i o a  
or 
. . 
Condi t ion ( i i ) i s  g iven by GW < 1 . 
Fill1l l ly,  oonai dor ontry into tho nonwnrrant i e s  marke t abov e 
• 
pN . Pri ce s arbi tr ar i l y  cl ose to pN are alway s an  i s sue ,  Fol l ow i n g  
th o a t a ndnrd  procodnrc ,  
and 
kN 2. [ (F + F' ) /swl
condi t ion ( ii i ) . If � > 0 
- C a1F/[ 2a2 s -
' 
the n  nN ( q) > 0 
llw .{ llw This  l s  equival ent t o � 2. F' /llN '
< •1 + �· 11.z ) Jll'fJ } I 
ao we  Mod  11N ( 1N)  .{ 0,  01:
Ronco � < 0 i t  
impo s s i bl e  s inco  nN ( lN) i 0 h no ccuary wheth er 1-N h th a prof i t  
m nximiz ing cho:l c o  for a dcv i nnt f inn  or not I Not c a l so, lrN )_ F '  /pN h 
suf f i c i ent for � 2. 0 ,  Q. E. D. 
Theorem 7 n :  N oco s sa ry and suf f i c i en t  condi ti ons for ..!l..Q.!l!!:ll!:2 c! 1.J.'1.! 
noncompe t it ive nnd warran t i e s  compe t i t ive whe n  p�ax = IN a r c : 
( 1 )  
( i i )  If ( a1 + 
2 a2) JlN > a1 s then :
( ii i )  
( 1 ) C a1 + 3 a2 > JJN > a1 ( 2 1 - a.,> > ( 111 + 2 112 > 1\
( 2 ) � · 2.  [ (F + F' ) /swl · - { a1F/[2a2 s .,.. (al + >1 . . ) JlN ) )
( 3 )  
I f  
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
� .{ a1F• / [ ( a1 + 2 a2 ) jlN -
( a1 + 2 112 ) jlN .{ 111 s th en :
( 111 + 2 az > llN > al �  > jlN
2 112 ( s - •w> l .
� 2. [ (F + F' ) /swl - [a1F/C a1 ·: 2 a2 ) f1N l
lrN i 111F 1 / [ 2a2 sw - flN ( a1 +2 a� ) J .
Proo f :  When the nomrnrrnn t i e s  m11rle t i s  noncompo,t i t ! Y o ,  th o " - . n ,-,;i d "  
c a se is for lN to be the maximum price in that marke t ,  
• 
Snpposo first there i s  a mass point at pN. Thon i t  mus t be 
that GN(pN) .. GN(p�) or z e ro profit s  would ove r-cons trdn  tho syst em
. . -
(wo woul d need zoro profits at I N, �· Pw and pN � e for all a )  0 ) , 
• • 
Set t ing oxpeotod dem and e qual to capa city at pN and Pw give s
• 21! 2 [nN(1 - GN/2)) + °w] } 
2 a2 c � c 1 - o�> �+ <nw/2> 1 1
• 
Sol ving for °N• °w and G N  yields
.. ' 
� .. [(a1 + 3 rt2 ) er - ( 2 a .,.  'w) J /a2er
°w .. [ ( 2 s - &y,) - ( a 1 + 2 112 ) er l / 112 er
• 
GN � [(a1 + 2 a2 ) er - a J /[ C a1 + 3 a2 ) er  - ( 2 s  - sW)J ,
Zero profits a t  l N implie s er .. � N/a1•
• 
(i) ,  and GN ) 0 yie ld s  1ubca s e  ( ii),
resta tem ent of � > 0 and nw > o .  
• 
That GN < 1 yie l ds condition
Condit ion (ii)(l) is then a 
• 
Lot qN be  th o first pri ce abovo � actual ly offered ,  Th en
or 
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It mus t be th at qN > pN or the system would aga in bo  ovcr-oonst rainc d ,
IIenoo 1" C  nood 
ir.· 1 '. l ',. I l • ' 
Dut nN(pN - e )  � 0 for e > 0 mus t  alao hold , Th l s  rcduor, r  t i>  
The latte r, however, lmplios qN > PN 11'hcn nw ) o .  Th i a  ) l � h\ 
oondit lo.n ( ii) ( 2 ) , 
Fina l ly con sider  .profits in tho 11'a rranti es  marke t 
whence 
and qN > pN imply kN > 0 .  If � > 0 then wo  need nw< qi'I) � 0 .
expe cted  demand n t  qW is  also l o s s  than 'w this reduce � t o  
These two constraints yield condition (ii)(3) . 
:5 8  
S ince 
* When ( n1 + 2 a2 ) p N � a1 s then no mau point app.o a n ;  ,, t GW Lc!i . 
• 
rN be tho first prico above � actua lly offered, Then pr : : : t <l i nE. 
exactly as above, noting rN > pN is  requi red, we go t ( 6 i ncr0 
• GN(pN) "' GN)
nw c [(111 + 2 a2 ) <J - "wl /•2<J 
nN "" ( s11 - a) /a2 e ignia ,
Tltnt 'lv ) 0 nnd nN ) 0 yie ld s  cond ition (iii) (1) . Tlt 11 t  nN < p N  ·· K )  � 0 
j '  
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for al l a > o impl i e s  rN > pN and y i e l d s  condi tion ( i i i ) ( 2 ) , Sinco
th e form of nw < P >  h thti ume on Cqw, 1w1  a s  abov e ,  and � � 0 i s  aga in 
impo a s i bl c, condi t i on ( i i i ) ( 3 )  is  y i el d o d  by nw(qw )  i o .  
Th9orem 7 b :  Ncce s i n ry and s uff i c i e nt cond i t i ons for nonwarran t i o s  
noncompe t it ive and wa rrant ies  comp e t i t iye when p�ax i s  a rbi trarily · 
closo to pN a r e :
( i )  F'  / sw < � < (F + 2F' ) /aw 
( i i )  � '  [(F + F' ) /sw l  - Ca2F/l sw<•1 .j. 2 a2 ) - •1 s }  a s  'w(nl + 2 a2 ) � nl s 
( i i i ) •w [F + 2(F' - 1Nsw> 1 /CF + F' - 1Nsw> < min fllw• fliJ .
• 
Proo f :  Z oro prof it s a t  pN - e f or al l  a > o· and a t  Pw imply
a ( a1 + 2 a2nw> (pN - c )  "' F 
a [ al + 2 112nw<
1/2 > J  .. sw.
Sol ving f or �· nw and a g i v e s
� .. [ a2F + ( n1 + 2 112 ) (F'  - 1N ;> J /a2 CF + 2(F' - 1N swll
� � a1C1N sw - F' ) /a2 [F + 2 (F' - � sw > l
a .. •w [F + 2 (F' - �;1 /a1 (F + F' - �sw> . 
Now pN - c > O impl i e s F + F' - 1N 'w > 0 ,  Hence a > 0 i f f
Thi s, in t urn, impl i e s  � ) 0 11nd 'if > 0 iff
These can be r ewri t t en, respectively, a a  
� < (F + 2F' ) /2 sw 
1N [ (a1 + 2 a2 ) F' - a2 Fl/sw<a1 + 2 112 )
� > F ' /sw·
But F' /sW ) [ (a1 + 2 a2 ) F' - a2FJ /sw(a1 + 2 a2 ) ,  10 nw )  0 J rn p l i o t
� )  o when a )  o .  Thus t h o  se cond constraint  i s  rcdun :'. ·: n l .  
• • Next,  l e t  GN b o  th o s i :z o  of any pot ent i al 11111 u  po i n t  � t  PN • 
Then 
or 
• GN c [ (n1 + 2 a2 ) a - s] /a2a� . 
• 1 i f f  (a1 + 2 n2 ) a  < a2a�, o rHence GN < 
� > [ (F + F' > /awl - Ca2F/C sw<a1 + 2 a2 ) - a1 is] ) i f  'w < � 1  + 2 Rz )  ) 
6 0  
111 s 
� < [ (F + F' ) /sw l  - Ca2F/C s1<111 + 2 a2l - •1 . ] ) i f  � ( 11 + 2 a2) < 111 g
Fi na l ly,  we no od nN ( lN) .{ O and nw Ow >  i 0 ,  Thc e e rodnco to 111o' < �N 
and a1a < llw r e sp e c t ively,  or 
Theorem S a :  N e c o s s n ry and s uff i ci ent condi tio-ns for Mb ir. � d._�j_t: 
• • 
i t ! h n max e I N nnd GN = GN( pN ) ) 0 nre :noncompet v o  w c PN 
Q, H. P.  
( i) 
( i i )  
( U i ) 
( iv )  
( v) 
F' /pN > 1N > F' f•w
( a1 + 2 n2 ) PN > '1 '
� [ < •1 
� [ <•1 
+ 4 a2 ) pN - 2a2 a 1  > •1F'
+ i a2 > PN - 2 •2 < • - •w > 1
> l:N [ ( a1 + 2 112 ) pN - 2 a2 s 
> •1F' 
� 2. [ (F + F' ) /•wl - C a1F/[2 a2 a - C a1 + 2 n2 ) �N ] )  •
• • • 
Proo f :  Suppo s e  GN(pw ) • GW > O .  The n  t h e  f ir s t  p r i c e  above pN 
" 
a c tual ly o f f e r e d  m u s t  bo tN whe r e  
To 100 th i s  no t e  f i r s t  t h a t  t h o  d i s tr ibut i ons ca nnot ov erl ap i n  th o 
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s e ns e  th at there e x i st s no pN a s upp GN s u ch th a t  Pw e s upp GW where 
J>w "" lw - lN + � except a t  � .. 1N• Supp o s e  th e r e  e x i s t s  such a 
pN( l � tN) . Th e n  e xp e c t e d  dem and a t � equal s e xp e c t e d  demand a t  Pw·
Z e r o  p r o f i t s  impl i o &  th i s  e xp e c t e d  demand e q ua l s F' /�. S i nce
oxp o c t o d  demand c a nno t  b e  co n s t ant ( o r  z ero prof i t s  is  v io l a t e d ) , 
thoro i a  o nly one p r i c e  which c a n  s a t i s fy equa l exp e c t e d  domands a nd 
z ero prof i t s ,  Th e l at t e r  impl i e s ,  how ev e r ,  t h a t  
(F ' /1N) (pN - c)  c F, 
or PN = 1N a a  dof ino d abov e .  I t  t h e n  f o l l ow s  t h a t  Pw = l:w• . who r e
It must bo th o  c n s c  th a t  l N > tN > pN ( th o  l a t t e r  b e c a u s e  tN � Pw 
wou l d  imply nW � O) . Ilonce we no o d
No t e  the r igh t-hand s i de o f  thi s c o n s t r a i nt impl i e s  kN > o .
. ,, . Next cons ider  1lf• � and GN' Z e r o  p1•0£ 1 t 1  a t  p�I �. o<l tW, 
r e sp e c t iv e l y ,  imply 
a { n1 + 2n2 [nN( 1  - C G�/2 ) ) + .'1v J l "' A 
• 
a [ a1 + 2 112� ( 1  - GN) ](tN - c )  � F .
• 
Solving f o r  °w· � and GN g i v e
� c [ ( 111 + 4 a2 ) a� - 2l::Ns + F' 1 /2a2aEN 
1lf c [ 21Ns  - F '  - C a1 + 2 n2 ) a�1 /2a2�
• GN "' 21N [ ( a1 + 2 n2 ) a  - a 1 / C C a1 + 4 a2 } a1N - 2�a + fl' } ,
• Wo r e q u i r e  0 < GN < 1 .  Ilence F' /n1� > a )  s /C a1 + 2 n2 ) ,  t l: i>  f l rtt
i nequa l i ty being oqulv n l ent to l N ) tN " We iho :roqui rll n11 > 0 anll 
nw ) O, or
"' 
Now c o n s i d e r  tho wa.rrant l e s  m 11:rko t .  Z e r o  prof i t s  a t  p"fi 1. ;�p t i c a
o r
• Tha t GW < 1 roqui r o n
a cond i t i o n  which impl i e s  ( a1 + 2 a2 ) a > 2 ( s  - •w> s i nce  1N > 0 and
F' 2. 0 .  
Now considor entry,  Pri c e s  a rbi trarily cl ose  t o  pN must  be
rul ed out , In the usu.al f a sh ion thi s  r e duce s t o  
Two other price s n o o d  t o  b e  chocked. One i s  1w , Th at  nN ( lw) � O ,  � 
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howev e r ,  reduce s t o  llN < llw or 1N < F'  fllw a c o n s t r a i nt equival ent to
$ 
lN > tN ' Fi na l ly, suppo s e  GW has  a m a s s  po i nt a t  Pw and l e t qW be tho
• 
f i r n t  price abov e pN a ct ua l ly offered,  Thon z er o  pro f i t s  impl i e s  
• • 
Th at qw > Pw t s' i mpl i ed by GW > 0 and that qw < tw is. i mpl i ed by
• 
GW 1 ,  De f i no qN = IN - . lw + qW, The n  nN ( qN) � O reduce s a g a i n  t o  
• • 
GW < 1 ,  A s imil a r  a c t  of calcu l a t i on s  appl i e s  when GW � O .
Subs t i t u t i ng a =  jlN/a1 int o t h o s e  vari ous cons t r a i nt s  g i v e s
th e  th eor em ,  Q, E , D ,  
Theo rem S b :  N o c o s s a ry  and s uf f i c i ent c o ndi t i ons f or b o t h  ma rkets 
• • 
nonc ompet it iyo when p�ax = lN and GN = GN(pN) = 0 arc : 
( i )  F ' /llN ) 1N > F' /sw 
( i i)  C n1 + 2 a2 l llN1N > a1F'  > a2 JlN� 
( i i i )  � [ 2 a2 8w - ( a1 + 2 a2 ) pN J > a1F ' 
(iv ) � 2. [(F + F' ) /sw1 - [a1F/flN ( a 1 + 2 a2 ) J .
Pro o f :  The l owost price i n  t h o  nonwarrant i e s  m nrl:e t i s  a g a i n  tN wh oro 
� and tw a r e  d e f i ne d  as  i n  the proof of Theorem 8 11 ,  lh 11 <: 0  '!T e  11 g11 i a  
ne e d  F' /PN > � > F' /sw • Zero pro f i t s  a t  tN impl i e s  
a ( a1 + 2 n2 �) ( tN - o )  = F, or
nN ( F '  - a1ukN ) /2 a2a� 
°'If ., f ( n.1 + 2 a2 )c:r �  - F' l /2 a2a�. 
Henc e  "N > O nnd "w > O imply ( 111 + 2 a2 ) a� > F' > 112cr�l'? '  Consi d o r
* $ 
next Gw<Pw > . c  GW. Z e r o  prof i t s  impl i e s
or 
Hence a; < 1 i f f  
. 
Aga i n, n s  i n  t h e  proof of Theorem 8 n, entry h o nly · 11 n  l s  ··;. o at pri i:>e s 
a rbi trarily c l o s e  to pN '  Th i s  i s  unprof i tabl e i f f  
Sub s t i tut i ng a = pN/a1 into t h o s e  �onstra i n t �  gives  th e 
theorem .  Q. E . D ,
Theorem B e :  I t  i s  impo s s ibl e for  both mnrl:e t s to b e  non •:' '�'.'11.�JJ!.ill 
whon p�
81 c lw and p�81 = tN . 
Proo f :  I n  th i s  oquil ibr ium tN and tW rem a i n  tho  o nl y  p .r i c � �  a t  wh i ch 
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t h o  suppo r t s  of G N  11.nd o 1  ,.ov orl ap" , but now ON( tN) = 1 11nd
Gw( tw> < 1 . We stil l need pN < tN < lN' or F' /pN > tN > F' /•w · · We
a l so no o d  nN ( lN) i O ,  or Jlw i PN ' wh ich i s  equival ent t o  F' /PN � 1N• a
contradi c t i on t o  tN < lN . Q,E,D, 
Theorem 8 d :  Ncce s 1ft ry and suffici ent cond i t i ons f or both m!rke t s  
noncompe t i t iye whon p;ax • lw and p�ax i s  arb i tra rily c l o s e  t o  p� 
� 
( i) [ (F + F' ) ) /swl - [ a1F/( a1 + 2 a2> Pwl > 1N > [ (F + F' ) /swl - CF/Pw>
( U ) � < [ (F + F' ) /swl - C a1F/[2a2 s - ( a1 + 2 a2> Pw l l
( i i i) � < [ (F + F' ) /awl - CF/C Z sw - Pw> l
( iv )  Pw � Pw
proo f : S ince �ax = lw, a = Pw/a1 , Zoro prof i t s  at pN - s for al l
e · ) 0 impl i e s  th n t
or 
nw ,. [Fsw - 111a(F  + F' - 1N 'w) J /2a2a(F + F' - 1N5w) 
� = [ ( e.1 +z a2 ) a(F + F' - 1Nsw> - Fsw l /2112a<F + F' - �sw > ·
Thus we ne ed  nw > 0 and nN > 0 ,  or 
• N ext cons ider m a s s  po int s ,  At PN
or 
Thus o"' < 1 i f fN
which reduce s t o
or 
• 
Hence· GW < 1 if f 
Final ly, cons i de r  entry nbov o pN' Fol l OYing the usnnl pr o c ,,iJ1uc, . · 
whence 
I Thus � < 0 h i mpo u i b l e  and nN ( p )  > 0 ,  Thu� n� � �N 
suf fice s t o  gua rantee ITN ( p )  i 0
.
for al) p ).  pN'
Q. F. P.  
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Co roJ1ary 1 :  I f  � < 0 thon t h o  'fl'arrant i e a  mad:e t c a n  nnvor oxht , 
6 7  
prob l 1J111 , Th 11 t  � ) 0 h po s s ibl li i n  our model l\rl s o 11  b o r.n a t e• o f  th b 
Fur th o rmoro, dh cont i nuons n11 tnro of m a r g i n a l  c o s t
.
a at s a nd 'w ., r. ( 1  - it ) , 
( i) tl1 0 nonwnrrant i e s  m a rke t i a  compe t i t i v o  i f f  a1 .{ PN/s . 
( i i )  t h e  nonwarrant i e a  marke t i s  noncomp e t i t i v e  i f f  a1 > pN/s , 
.E!.2.Q.! : Thi a  r o s nl t  f ol l 01fs f rom not i ng a l l  c a s e s  exi s t  1 and 5 roq n i r e
� > O, 11nd when kN < O, llw > .JIN , Th i a  r educ.e s t h e  ne c e s s a ry and
s u f f i c i ent condi t i ons of Th e o r em s  1 and 5 t o  ( i )  and ( i i )  abov e ,  
Q. E. D • 
.fQ!.Q.�i:-;:_1_: If F' � 0 and 1N > 0 ,  th en tho f o l l ow ing typo s o f
equi l i br i a  11 r o  po s si bl e ( ignor i ng t h e  " p a th o l o g i ca l "  c n s o s  7 b  and B d) :
( 1 )  a l l  th o v ar i ous compe t i t i v e  equi l ib r i a  
( 2 )  nonwnrrant i c 1  none x i s t e nt a nd warrant i e s  noncompe t i t i v o
( 3 ) nonw a rran t i e s  compe t i tive and warrarit i c 1  noncompe t i t i v e
Fur th e rm o r e, t h o  no c e s s a ry and s uf f i c i ent cond i t i ons for e a ch a r e  .!!..Q.1 
mutua l ly exc l us iv e .  
Corol l ary 1 i s  t h e  i nt er e s t i ng r e s u l t ·h a r e ,  Reca l l  
1N � C lw - cw )  - ( lN - c ) ,  If we a s sum e d  di f f er e nt i abl e, u- shaped
• 
average c o s t  curv e s ,  th en i n  a compe t i t iv e  equi l i b r i um pN � m a r g i na l
• 
co at of nonw arrant i e s  E MC}i and Pw = m a r g i na l  c o st of w arrant i e �
• • •  
II M<;,. Thus � � o, - MCw) - (_lN - M�) • ( lw - �w > - ( lN - pN ) . 
"' . 
Ilcnco 1W - lN < Pw - pN woul d imply 1N < O .  When 1N < 0 only two 
po a s i b l o equil ibr i um c o nf igur a t i ons c a n  occur, in ne i th er of w h i ch any 
f i rm s  o f f e r  th e good w ith a warranty; i , e , ,  th orc i s  no coverngo 
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